Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media.

Stressed over Gaza and its future, Arabs across the region in the words of one of the writers below:

 “…debate its meaning, divide over ‘resistance’ and ‘normalization’, and quarrel in capitals and cafés alike.”

Both the two Arab writers below – publishing pieces on Gaza this past November in the wake of the cease-fire deal – lament the result of a “weakening” of the Palestinian cause, allowing it to turn from a unifying symbol of Palestinian liberation into a catalyst for regional Arab fragmentation, with many Arab states simply weary of the endless turmoil.

Turning inward and focusing on self-interest and their own security, coupled with the recognition of a fatigue that has settled in Western capitals from Washington to London to Paris, has a situation arrived where policymakers have become resigned to simply managing the crisis rather than solving it?

David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land
December 6, 2025

(Articles translated from the Arabic by Asaf Zilberfarb)

GAZA: A FORBIDDEN ZONE IN HISTORY
By Mohammed Al Rumaihi

Asharq Al-Awsat, London, November 2025

Today, Gaza finds itself in a liminal state — neither engulfed in full-scale war nor basking in genuine peace. The same can be said of the West Bank, caught between two unrelenting forces, suspended in a grim equilibrium. Lebanon, too, drifts in a historical gray zone, belonging neither to open war nor to stable peace.

This suspended reality has turned Gaza, home to more than two million people, into a tragic emblem of frozen conflict and fading hope. Under siege, divided, and repeatedly destroyed, it stands as a symbol of human rights violations and a draining battlefield that exhausts Palestinians, Arabs, and global powers alike. When politics offer no exit, people become hostages to geography, and regions such as Gaza, the West Bank, and southern Lebanon remain trapped, unable to progress or break free.

Since 1948, the Palestinian territories have been perpetual victims of geography  hemmed in:

– by Israel, which treats them as a security buffer

– by a Palestinian Authority paralyzed by its own stagnation

– by an Arab world torn between sympathy and confusion; and – by regional actors exploiting the crisis for their own ends.

It is a vivid example of what historians describe as a “deadly political vacuum,” a moment when history itself halts, rendering solutions impossible and societies immobile, left only to wait for deliverance from beyond the realm of politics.

This is not unprecedented: The Korean Peninsula has remained frozen since the 1953 armistice, its borders tense, its people still waiting for a peace that may never arrive. Berlin once stood divided by a wall of fear and suspicion; its people imprisoned in competing ideologies until the Soviet Union’s fall opened a way out. Kashmir, too, has long been locked in a deadly stalemate between India and Pakistan, where periodic violence shatters lives and stifles progress.

Gaza today mirrors all these examples — sealed borders, a crippled economy, deep internal fractures, and a population suffering in silence. The internationalization of the conflict has stripped it of its human and national essence, leaving Palestinians torn between a self-preserving Authority and a Hamas leadership trapped in its own past. Amid this paralysis, Gazans survive between poverty, isolation, and dependence. Education and health systems have collapsed, an entire generation deprived of opportunity. They know only destruction and blockade, their days filled with unemployment and displacement. Palestinian ingenuity has turned inward —from building a nation to simply enduring its ruins. The middle class, once the stabilizing core, has eroded, and the concept of the state has crumbled into factional control.

The Palestinian national project itself risks shrinking into a fragment of land, a wounded memory, and a collection of sacrifices. Gaza’s tragedy has spilled across the Arab world, politically and emotionally. Arabs across the region debate its meaning, divide over “resistance” and “normalization”, and quarrel in capitals and cafés alike. This discord has weakened the Palestinian cause, turning it from a unifying symbol of liberation into a catalyst for fragmentation. Some Arab states, weary of endless turmoil, now prioritize their own security, while regional powers manipulate the conflict to serve their ambitions.

The result is fatigue in Western capitals — from Washington to London to Paris — where policymakers manage the crisis but no longer seek to solve it. The international momentum once pushing for peace has vanished, and even global sympathy, once rekindled by recent tragedies, has cooled. The stalemate has hardened into permanence. Yet the gravest danger lies not in Gaza’s physical ruin but in the decay of meaning itself. A Palestinian child grows up knowing only the whine of drones and the crash of bombs, learning that peace is an illusion and justice an empty word. Over time, despair turns to rage, and human lives are reduced to weapons. Gaza transforms from a cause into a curse, from a struggle of resistance into an enduring tragedy.

What Gaza needs is not pity or another conference, but a courageous, unified vision to break this historical impasse. The lessons of Berlin, Korea, and Kashmir teach us that a state of neither war nor peace is deadlier than war itself — it kills by suffocation. Breaking free demands that Arabs reclaim their role, not as passive spectators but as builders of renewal, urging Palestinian factions: Enough division — unite! Only then can the Palestinian people recover their dignity and restart history’s halted march. In the end, neither war has been salvation nor peace a fulfilled promise. Only a unified Palestinian will can forge a new meaning for life amid the ashes.

– Mohammed Al Rumaihi

WHAT WILL BE THE FATE OF GAZA?
By Tarek Fahmy

Al-Ittihad, UAE, November 8, 2025

Amid the continuing developments in the Gaza Strip, efforts to stabilize the fragile ceasefire, and mounting pressure on Israel to halt its violations and unprecedented assaults, a critical question emerges:

Has Gaza become primarily an Arab concern, or has it evolved into an international issue now shaped by the United States and European powers alongside certain Arab states?

The reality suggests that the Strip’s affairs were internationalized the moment the ceasefire was declared and swift diplomatic action — particularly by Washington — took center stage. The establishment of a US-Israeli coordination center operating on the outskirts of Gaza, in partnership with several European nations, highlights that Gaza’s future is now an international concern. The active involvement of countries like France and Britain reinforces the notion that whatever unfolds next will not be decided by local actors alone, but within a global framework led by major powers. Developments point toward the Strip being placed under a form of international trusteeship, possibly through a multinational force authorized by a UN resolution that defines the scope of intervention.

Israel, for its part, seeks to shape this resolution to ensure it serves its long-term political and security objectives — allowing it freedom of action in response to any future movement by Palestinian factions and aligning with its plan to divide the enclave into two zones of control. After consolidating its security presence over more than half of Gaza, Israel appears determined to maintain the situation under an international umbrella involving the United States, Britain, France, and select Islamic countries. This reinforces the understanding that Gaza’s destiny now lies in the hands of external powers that will manage it within regional and global parameters.

In this context, Arab involvement may be confined to funding reconstruction projects that remain impossible as long as Hamas retains control. While it is hoped that Arab states will contribute financially, questions persist:

How, where, and under whose supervision will this reconstruction occur amid such fluid circumstances?

These uncertainties highlight the limitations of Arab influence, particularly as Egypt prepares to host a reconstruction conference later this month within an Arab, Islamic, and international framework. Yet Europe is already planning a separate reconstruction model, potentially implemented in areas under Israeli control as a first phase — an approach that could deepen international intervention in Gaza.

The overlapping agendas and conflicting objectives among all parties make any consensus elusive. While all publicly claim to seek a ceasefire, beneath the surface lies a web of competing interests and contradictions. The American position remains aligned with Israel’s core priorities; differences between them are tactical, not fundamental. Israel continues to steer US policy to fit its own interests, while Washington, aware of this dynamic, increases its pressure on Tel Aviv within limits.

The establishment of the US-Israeli coordination center represents not only tighter collaboration but also Washington’s acknowledgment that security dominates all other considerations. Reconstruction, collective security arrangements, and the deployment of an international force are thus postponed indefinitely — effectively freezing the Strip’s situation in place. Meanwhile, tensions between Hamas, other Palestinian factions, and the Palestinian Authority remain unresolved. The PLO’s insistence on administrative control in Gaza complicates any Egyptian-led efforts to reach a broader agreement, as cooperation between the Authority and the factions seems improbable under current conditions.

The Gaza crisis is now moving in multiple, often conflicting directions, each shaped by distinct calculations. All sides publicly stress the need for a ceasefire, fearing that renewed war could ignite a wider regional confrontation. This fear drives international actors to prioritize de-escalation, containment, and incremental stabilization while maintaining the uneasy status quo.

Hamas remains armed, reconstruction has not begun, and political commitments remain unfulfilled. The situation drifts toward stagnation, with each player recalibrating its options. For now, the prevailing approach centers on managing rather than resolving the crisis — maintaining the current state of controlled instability. Israel continues its unilateral security measures with American military backing, while Washington insists on de-escalation despite Israeli breaches of its plans. Until the broader vision becomes clear, Gaza — and its ripple effects across the Middle East — will remain an issue governed by international dynamics rather than Arab agency.

-Tarek Fahmy

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

With Israel locked into an unending war that its government is either unwilling or incapable of extricating itself from, Lay of the Land this week taps into the Arab perspective of what is evolving and the ramifications for Palestinians and the region.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed questions whether Israel now with its once challenging neighboring powers now weakened or dismantled, does it envision itself as a potential partner in coexistence or will it opt for the role of the Middle East’s “self-appointed policeman”?

• For Egyptian journalist Abdel-Mohsen Salama, French President Emmanuel Macron’s pledge to recognize a Palestinian state evokes the memory of the 1917 Balfour Declaration marking the beginning “of the Israeli implantation in the region,” and hopes it will portend the same result for the long-suffering Palestinian people.

• For Majed Kayali writing in Lebanon, the sweeping wave of international support for Palestine is a direct consequence of international revulsion of the policies of the Netanyahu-Smotrich-Ben-Gvir government, “which seeks to erase Palestinians from the political map.” While positive pointers, the writer warns that Palestinian vision needs to be tempered with realism as   “the state now being promised … will fall far short of the one they have long envisioned or dreamed of.”

David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land

(Articles translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

(1)

IS ISRAEL THE REGION’S NEW POLICEMAN?
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

Asharq Al-Awsat, London, August 1

Seven years ago, I wrote about “Israel’s regional rise”. Today, its presence looms even larger, shaping the massive geopolitical shifts that followed Hamas’s attacks of Oct. 7. In the aftermath, a pressing question emerges:

How does Israel view itself now? 

It seems unlikely that Israel will remain content with its old role as a defensive actor confined to its disputed borders. Instead, it appears poised to pursue political ambitions that mirror its military strength.

For half a century, Tel Aviv’s strategy centered on survival, on defending its existence and its long-held territories while countering threats from powers like Iran and navigating the hostilities of regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Hafez Assad’s Syria.

But that era is over. The neighboring powers that once challenged Israel have been weakened or dismantled. For the first time in its modern history, Israel faces no regional force capable of posing an existential threat. Even Iran, long its most formidable adversary, lacks the offensive capacity to challenge Israel today. While this balance could shift if Tehran rebuilds its power, such a reversal appears distant and uncertain. 

As circumstances evolve, Israel’s strategy shifts with them. It is no longer merely a border guard; it seeks to become an assertive player in the regional arena. The Middle East today is fragmented, alliances blurred, and many actors are waiting for a resolution to conflicts that have left the so-called Tehran axis greatly diminished.

Two paths lie before Israel. The first is to cast itself as a stabilizing force, one that preserves a fragile new order and engages its neighbors in pursuit of peaceful coexistence. This would mean moving past the decades of war and boycotts, normalizing relations with more Arab states, and consolidating its geopolitical position by neutralizing any remaining hostile groups.

The second path is more disruptive: Israel could wield its superior power to reshape the region to suit its political vision and interests, raising the specter of fresh confrontations. Regional states have long harbored concerns about such ambitions. Past regimes, from Saddam’s Iraq to revolutionary Iran, viewed Israel as a rival standing in the way of their own expansionist dreams, cloaking their hostilities in the language of Palestinian solidarity.

Hamas’s Oct. 7 attacks propelled Israel further into the regional equation, positioning it not just as a reactive actor but as a force with wider ambitions.

Does Israel envision itself as a partner in coexistence, or as a regional powerbroker? Is it becoming the Middle East’s self-appointed policeman? Recent actions suggest Israel seeks a central role in the region’s political and military contests – whether as a direct combatant, a power broker, or even a leader of new alliances. It has already moved to block Iraqi involvement in Syria and curb Turkish influence.

Meanwhile, the Netanyahu government’s appetite for continued conflict has reignited fears of a “Greater Israel” agenda and dreams of territorial expansion. Yet these notions are largely stoked by Israel’s adversaries – Iran, Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood, and leftist groups – who warn of expansionist plots to rally opposition. 

In reality, Israel’s small size and its preoccupation with absorbing the territories it seized in 1967 limit such ambitions. For decades, it has poured resources into entrenching its hold on these areas, fending off efforts to establish a Palestinian state or return lands to Jordanian or Egyptian control.

Geography is not Israel’s greatest challenge – demography is. The state is committed to preserving its Jewish identity, yet 20% of its citizens are Palestinian. Annexing the occupied territories would push Palestinians to half the population, threatening the state’s defining character. 

This demographic reality makes expansion unlikely but raises fears that extremists might exploit chaos, as they did in the aftermath of Oct. 7, when Hamas’s attacks were used as a pretext for mass expulsions in the West Bank and Gaza. Such actions, while possible, remain politically fraught.

Talk of a “Greater Israel”, illustrated by speculative maps and ideological manifestos, feels closer to myth than policy – a counterpart to the nostalgic Arab and Islamic longing for lost Andalusia. Israel seeks dominance, but it dreads the inevitable demographic fusion that would follow annexation, a fear unlike that of most Middle Eastern states that absorbed multiple ethnic groups in their formation.

Politically, Israel’s future course remains undefined. Fresh from its recent military successes, it is still shaping its long-term strategy. Whether it chooses to become a peaceful state open to Arab neighbors or a regional enforcer perpetually engaged in battles, one truth persists: The Middle East is too complex, too driven by competing forces and ambitions, for any single power to fully dominate it.

– Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

(2)

MACRON’S PROMISE AND GREAT BRITON’S HISTORICAL BURDEN
By Abdel-Mohsen Salama

Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, August 2

French President Emmanuel Macron’s pledge to recognize a Palestinian state evokes the memory of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, issued by the British government more than a century ago. That historic document, delivered by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leading figure in the Zionist movement, expressed support for establishing a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine.

This fateful declaration marked the beginning of the Israeli implantation in the region, culminating in the formal emergence of Israel in 1948. Yet from the outset, Israel was never content with the borders loosely outlined in that declaration, which, at least on paper, stipulated that the rights of the non-Jewish Arab inhabitants of Palestine would not be infringed upon. 

Instead, it expanded relentlessly, consuming land far beyond the initial mandate, swallowing Palestinian territories and encroaching on neighboring countries in what many describe as a cancerous spread.

Seventy-seven years on, Macron’s promise rekindles a faint hope that the long and brutal ordeal of the Palestinian people – marked by displacement, suffering, starvation, and even acts described as genocide – might finally yield a sovereign Palestinian state. The importance of this French gesture lies not only in its potential to disrupt Europe’s otherwise unwavering support for Israel but also in the symbolic weight it carries for Britain.

British Foreign Secretary David Lammy has publicly admitted that his government intends to follow suit in recognizing Palestine this September, while acknowledging Britain’s historic culpability in the crisis. 

There was no record of systematic persecution of Jews in Palestine or other Arab countries; the atrocities committed against Jews were overwhelmingly European in origin, from Nazi Germany’s horrors to lesser-known persecutions elsewhere on the continent. Yet Palestine bore the weight of Europe’s sins, paying the price for crimes it never committed, forced to absorb the creation of a Jewish state on its lands without historical justification.

Today, Israel inflicts upon Palestinians atrocities that echo, and in many ways surpass, the injustices Jews once endured in Europe. Entire communities are starved, deprived of water, medicine, and basic human needs, subjected to what many describe as a modern-day genocide, executed with chilling precision and brutality.

Macron’s announcement, echoed soon after by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, spurred Canada and Australia to consider similar moves, joining a wave of European nations – including Spain, Norway, Ireland, Sweden, Slovenia, and others – that have already recognized Palestine.

This cascading recognition has breathed new life into the long-dormant two-state solution, a vision recently reaffirmed at a high-profile conference co-hosted by Saudi Arabia and France. 

The question that now looms over global diplomacy is whether the US will, at long last, heed the call of reason and moral responsibility, as Britain has belatedly done, and take a decisive step toward restoring genuine and enduring peace to a region that has known little but turmoil for over a century.

– Abdel-Mohsen Salama

(3)

A SWEEPING WAVE OF SUPPORT FOR PALESTINE
By Majed Kayali

An-Nahar, Lebanon, August 1

Following France’s pledge to recognize a Palestinian state at the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting in September – and with both the UK prime minister and foreign secretary confirming that London is moving in the same direction – it has become increasingly clear that international political pressure, led by France and Saudi Arabia, will in the next two months focus on supporting the Palestinians’ right to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza.

This would be part of a broader settlement aimed at ending Israel’s ongoing war of extermination against the Palestinians, particularly in Gaza, opening the path to wider Arab-Israeli normalization, and reforming the Palestinian Authority. This represents a political shift of major significance for the Palestinians, despite their devastating circumstances and the relentless campaign Israel has waged against them for nearly two years.

Four permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, Russia, France, and Britain – are now expected to back the establishment of a Palestinian state. The US stands alone, so far, in resisting this shift, and it remains uncertain how Washington will respond to this unprecedented move by two of its closest Western allies.

The US faces two choices:

• Exercise its veto in the Security Council to block any resolution, or
• abstain and allow it to pass.

The latter option is not inconceivable, given the relatively flexible tone recently struck by US President Donald Trump on this issue. It is worth recalling that the US supported UN Resolution 1397 in 2002, under president George W. Bush, which affirmed the Palestinian right to statehood.

A distinction must be made, however, between a UN General Assembly resolution recognizing this right – which already exists, with 145 countries acknowledging Palestine as an observer state – and a binding UN Security Council resolution. The latter has repeatedly failed due to US opposition and the use of its veto. 

Formally Recognized                   Pending Recognition

In previous General Assembly votes on Palestinian statehood, more than two-thirds of UN members supported the resolution, while only nine countries – including the US, Israel, Hungary, and a handful of Pacific Island nations – voted against it, and 25 abstained.

The current push for recognition is fueled by a combination of global sympathy for the Palestinian people, mounting outrage over Israel’s devastating war in Gaza, and growing willingness to expose Israel as a colonial, racist, and religiously exclusive state. 

In many ways, it is a direct consequence of the policies pursued by the Netanyahu-Smotrich-Ben-Gvir government, which seeks to erase Palestinians from the political map, enforce peace by brute force, and normalize relations with Arab states while offering no concessions.

Yet all these declarations and diplomatic moves hinge on a crucial factor: an American decision to either support the resolution or refrain from vetoing it. And even with political recognition, the Palestinians cannot exercise their rights without concrete changes on the ground.

First, Israel must be pressured to halt the war in Gaza, allow full-scale reconstruction, and permit unimpeded humanitarian aid into the Strip. Second, settlement expansion in the West Bank and Jerusalem must cease, and a lasting solution must be found to deal with the growing problem of armed settler militias terrorizing Palestinians.

Third, Palestinians must be allowed to govern themselves freely and invest in their own resources. At the same time, the Palestinian leadership must do its part by rehabilitating the political structures represented by the Palestinian Authority and restoring its legitimacy, as this will be critical in countering Israel’s occupation policies and engaging with international efforts.

Yet Palestinians must also recognize that the state now being promised to them will fall far short of the one they have long envisioned or dreamed of. The realities of power heavily favor Israel, global circumstances remain largely unfavorable, and internal Palestinian divisions and institutional weakness limit their ability to shape the future state they seek.

– Majed Kayali

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

In our latest newsletter,we have selected Middle East Arab writers addressing:

(1) In light of “significant rifts” between the US administration and the Israeli government, how do the major players in the region strategically proceed in a rapidly evolving political landscape?

(2) While harboring few illusions about a sudden US reversal in policy vis-à-vis Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) recognizes that new geopolitical currents are taking shape that demand its “engagement rather than passivity.”

(3) The surprise and sudden US lifting of sanctions on Syria deviating from the traditional approach of a “prolonged evaluation process.” What is driving this change in US thinking?

David E. Kaplan

Editor Lay of the Land

(*Articles translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

(1)

ISRAEL’S STRATEGY FOR MANAGING TENSIONS WITH THE US
By Tarek Fahmy

Al-Ittihad, UAE, May 17
Israeli media outlets have highlighted significant rifts between the US administration and the Israeli government, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, stemming from disagreements over how negotiations and the ongoing conflict are being managed as well as over broader priorities shaping bilateral relations.

These tensions appear to go beyond transient political positions or reactive policies; they are not simply tied to how the Middle East is being navigated politically, nor are they a direct response to the tone set by President Donald Trump during his recent tour of the region.

They are also not just about the US president’s push to end the war in Gaza, secure a prisoner exchange deal, and confront the increasingly aggressive Israeli policies, especially following the release of American hostage Edan Alexander.

President Trump’s success in managing US relations with the Gulf states can be attributed to his understanding of their central role in guiding regional strategy, participating in diplomatic deals, easing tensions, and solving crises born out of the October 7, 2023, events and their far-reaching repercussions.

Regardless of the outcomes of President Trump’s visit to the region and amid efforts to redefine Arab-American ties, key developments are on the horizon, the most pivotal of which is the need to interpret American-Israeli differences through a strategic and political lens.

The current tensions may dissipate in the short term if a ceasefire is achieved and a prisoner exchange is completed, thereby restoring a semblance of normalcy to bilateral relations, especially since President Trump is actively advocating for de-escalation in Gaza, regardless of his specific proposals for managing the territory.

Such issues must be approached with a pragmatic understanding of the facts on the ground, particularly as Hamas appears to be shifting toward a more realistic stance that could mark the beginning of a new chapter in its engagement with the US administration, potentially transforming it into a significant actor in ongoing developments.

This evolution would likely be contingent on Hamas relinquishing control of Gaza in favor of an administrative committee overseen by the Palestinian Authority (PA), in alignment with both international and Arab calls for reforming the PA’s governance.

The scale of the changes following President Trump’s visit, along with their implications, will likely bring about further repositioning across the board.

Whether Israel embraces or opposes the unfolding events, disputes are bound to intensify if the US administration continues to engage directly with Hamas by supporting mediation efforts.

This scenario would establish a workable and necessary equation for future negotiations, though it would inevitably face obstacles, chief among them, the debate over Hamas’ role, even if it steps back from day-to-day governance.

Particularly complex will be the question of disarming Palestinian factions within Gaza and placing those weapons under a regulated framework, which will demand mechanisms and policy stances that go beyond the current scope of expectations.

Should the US initiative to distribute humanitarian aid in Gaza and modify governance structures prove successful, complications may still arise regarding the extent and nature of Arab involvement and the broader reconstruction effort.

This remains a contentious issue between Washington and certain Arab states that resist any American or Israeli presence, even temporarily – a position that could hinder forthcoming steps.

Naturally, once a prisoner exchange deal is finalized, the process would shift to the next phase of implementation, which has yet to occur given Israel’s resistance and the measures it continues to employ in Gaza.

Despite existing disagreements, this has not derailed the parallel positions held by the US and Israel, which appear to be coordinating measures while monitoring evolving political dynamics among all involved parties.

American diplomatic outreach to Hamas remains active, underpinned by the belief that the release of prisoners is a critical foundation upon which further progress can be made, especially under US pressure directed at the Israeli government to facilitate a new phase of engagement.

Without such efforts, diverging visions could deepen, resulting in a stalemate where Hamas – operating on a strategy rooted in the pursuit of legitimacy – emerges as the primary beneficiary of continued disunity.

The US administration, and President Trump in particular, appears to hold a clear long-term vision for managing this enduring friction with the Israeli leadership, one that includes the potential support for an alternative political coalition in Israel that is more open to compromise.

Such a development could precipitate the collapse or reformation of Netanyahu’s current coalition, though President Trump is unlikely to pursue this route unless a major breach in the relationship occurs – a scenario that, for now, seems improbable.

Although political differences will persist, they are unlikely to undermine the fundamental strength and durability of US-Israeli relations.

– Tarek Fahmy

(2)

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY’S POST-WAR CHALLENGES
By Fadhil al-Manasif

Al-Arab, London, May 17

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s upcoming visit to Lebanon cannot be divorced from the broader political landscape in which the Palestinian Authority is currently operating.

Abbas’s diplomatic tour, which began in Moscow and will continue through several Arab and international capitals, is not a ceremonial gesture but, rather, a deliberate attempt to reframe the PA as a credible and responsible actor at a time when regional dynamics are shifting and multiple initiatives are converging.

The stop in Beirut, in particular, goes beyond traditional diplomatic engagement to address one of the thorniest and most enduring issues in Lebanese-Palestinian relations:

the question of weapons within the Palestinian refugee camps.

A longtime source of mutual concern and caution, this issue is now being approached through a framework that enjoys consensus among both Lebanese and Palestinian leaders, grounded in a simple but decisive premise:

there can be no genuine security outside the authority of the Lebanese state, and no real stability without the exclusive control of arms by the state.

At the same time, efforts to improve ties with the US, despite the challenges posed by the Trump administration’s unequivocally pro-Israel stance, may be a tactical maneuver designed to reassert the Palestinian presence on the international stage. Effective diplomacy often requires engaging with even the most unbalanced interlocutors when doing so can build alliances or reduce pressure.

In this light, the PA’s attempt to project itself as a moderate and responsible political entity serves not only to broaden its diplomatic appeal but also to challenge the prevailing Israeli narrative that seeks to equate the Palestinian struggle with terrorism. This explains the PA’s clear effort to distinguish its position from that of certain armed factions, particularly on contentious matters like the refugee camps in Lebanon.

The PA’s renewed focus on this issue is not a matter of settling internal disputes but a strategic decision driven by the need to demonstrate goodwill to its international partners, foremost among them the US administration. Through this initiative, the PA is recalibrating its message, asserting its independence from groups that reject the concept of state legitimacy, and signaling its willingness to engage the evolving regional reality from a place of responsibility rather than reaction.

While the PA harbors no illusions about a sudden policy reversal from Washington, it recognizes that new geopolitical currents are taking shape that demand engagement rather than passivity. The resurfacing debate over regional accords resembling the Abraham Accords is not occurring in a vacuum; rather, it reflects broader attempts to redraw the regional power map in the aftermath of the Gaza war.

Although these agreements were forged under different circumstances, they are now being positioned as a prerequisite for any post-conflict framework for Gaza, suggesting that the path forward is contingent on reconstructing regional alliances under American stewardship. The PA knows that its room to maneuver is limited, but it is determined not to be excluded from the discussions shaping the next phase of the region’s future.

The signals the PA is sending through its latest diplomatic efforts are in line with the aspirations of key decision-making capitals, which are eager to see a Palestinian entity capable of meaningful negotiation and of helping reorder the region’s priorities without resorting to reckless escalation or futile confrontation.

Yet this should not be mistaken for a willingness to accept any arrangement that undermines Palestinian rights or reduces the PA to a mere administrative extension of the Israeli occupation. Since Oct. 7, the regional and international calculus has undergone a profound transformation. The assumptions that once governed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict no longer hold, and global perceptions have shifted as well.

Within this altered framework, the PA now faces a pivotal juncture that could be defined as “to be or not to be.” What we are witnessing today is not a betrayal of long-standing principles, but, rather, a deliberate and thoughtful reassessment of how best to act under new conditions – an effort to craft a forward-looking strategy that balances principled political resistance with deft diplomacy, all while maintaining the inalienable right to establish an independent Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital.

 – Fadhil al-Manasif

(3)

WHY LIFT SANCTIONS ON DAMASCUS?
By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

Asharq al-Awsat, London, May 18

Sanctions on Syria were expected to remain in place for at least a year, driven by concerns over the country’s uncertain political future, skepticism toward its new leadership, and apprehensions from regional powers such as Israel.

In US policy, the lifting of sanctions is rarely swift – it typically follows a prolonged evaluative process. Precedents like the US agreement with the Taliban, despite maintaining economic sanctions on Afghanistan for four years, illustrate how political agreements do not immediately translate into economic leniency.

Compounding this, there is an ongoing internal debate within the US administration about whether sanctions on Syria should be lifted at all.

It is within this complex context that a direct appeal to President Donald Trump, facilitated by a key regional partner like Saudi Arabia, emerged as the most expedient path forward.

This strategy, however, requires reciprocal efforts from Syria’s al-Sharaa government, which must demonstrate tangible commitments – namely, ensuring that local armed groups are brought under control, minority communities are protected, and extremist ideologies are actively countered, since failure to do so could ultimately undermine Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s own authority.

Opposition to lifting sanctions largely hinges on the premise that the new Syrian leadership remains designated as a terrorist entity and must first prove otherwise.

The US government has articulated a series of conditions, five of which President Trump emphasized following his meeting with al-Sharaa. These include:

– The withdrawal of all foreign fighters.

– Cooperation in the global fight against terrorism in Syria.

– The expulsion of Palestinian militias.

– The assumption of control over detention facilities holding  ISIS members.

– The initiation of formal relations with Israel.

Before assessing the feasibility of these demands, it is worth considering why, as President Trump put it, the new Syrian regime deserves “a chance.”

First, the al-Sharaa government is now a political reality – one that international actors must contend with, much like other regimes in the region that rely on or tolerate militia alliances. Regime change is no longer a viable objective, returning to war is out of the question, and the Syrian people deserve an exit from the seemingly endless tunnel of suffering and instability.

Second, the removal of Iranian influence from Syria represents a historical turning point – not just for Syria but also for Lebanon and Palestine. It has helped liberate these areas from Tehran’s overreach, which, had it continued, could have irreparably destabilized the region.

Weakening the new government now could reverse this progress, either by creating a power vacuum or by inviting Iran’s return through a weakened Damascus.

Third, if the al-Sharaa government fails to meet its obligations, sanctions can easily be reinstated. On the other hand, refusing to ease them could foster rebellion, descent into chaos, or drive Damascus into alliances that increase regional volatility.

Fourth, Israel’s presence looms large. Today, Israel is the principal strategic architect in the region, asserting its dominance and dictating terms on military presence and weapon distribution among its neighbors.

Comparing Damascus to Kabul is misleading, as Syria exists within Israel’s sphere of military influence, where any miscalculation invites swift response. This makes Israeli security interests both a constraint and a stabilizing factor.

Lebanon is already operating under what might be termed Israeli security management, and similar dynamics may apply to Syria.

Caught between the necessity of recognizing the current reality, fears of descending into chaos, and the risk of a renewed Iranian foothold, the international community’s safest course is to help Syria rebuild.

Conditions for cooperation are legitimate and must serve both Syrian stability and broader regional security. Syria remains central to a volatile geopolitical corridor, and abandoning it to chaos is certain to have severe consequences.

The most practical approach – albeit one not without risk – is to allow Damascus to restore itself. It is far preferable to cooperate with Syria now than to face a far more intractable crisis in the years ahead.

If efforts are delayed, the damage may be irreparable. Since December, amid fear and cautious hope, the al-Sharaa government has made visible efforts to show openness and a willingness to cooperate; the next step is for it to move beyond gestures and deliver results.

The conditions set by the US – though diplomatically awkward – ultimately align with Syria’s long-term interests. A ban on foreign fighters is a universal expectation; counterterrorism is a global obligation.

As for the Palestinian groups based in Syria, many are remnants of the Assad regime’s network, used in conflicts against Arab states, especially in Lebanon – Hamas being the exception, as it did not originate in Syria.

It is expected that al-Sharaa will expel these militias, just as Jordan did in the past and Lebanon is attempting to do now.

Regarding the stipulation of establishing ties with Israel, it’s important to note that al-Sharaa and his ministers have previously expressed willingness to consider such a move within the framework of an Arab peace initiative.

Whatever additional concerns remain unaddressed here, the region can absorb and adapt to change, and that is preferable to letting Syria descend into the most dangerous form of disorder.

The Damascus government must recognize and distance itself from escalating regional and international tensions. In his public statements, President al-Sharaa has frequently indicated an openness to engagement and a desire to prioritize development and progress over confrontation.

– Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

In our latest newsletter,we focus on Middle East Arab writers addressing:
(1) The challenges within the Palestinian Authority (PA) that require more than choosing a successor to Abbas but a “far more pragmatic response that enables the PA to evolve and regain credibility.”
(2)The issue of Hezbollah relinquishing its arms which it views as “sacrosanct” for its survival and influence.
(3)The comparisons  of the May 2025 protests in Gaza against Hamas and the endless protests in Tel Aviv against the Natanyahu government.

David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land

(*Articles translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

(1)

CHANGE IN PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

By Tarek Fahmy

Al-Ittihad, United Arab Emirates, May 4.

The Israeli government is closely monitoring the Palestinian leadership’s recent efforts to adopt new positions and directions in response to proposals discussed at the latest Arab Summit. These proposals emphasized the need to modernize the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) institutions, many of which suffer from a legitimacy crisis due to the prolonged absence of presidential and legislative elections – an issue that has deeply impacted their functionality.

The Palestinian Central Council has been entrusted with various responsibilities, operating under the direct supervision of President Mahmoud Abbas. However, the core issue is not the appointment of a vice president, as seen with Hussein al-Sheikh, but rather the lack of genuine reform across the Palestinian political system. This system must be overhauled to reflect the realities and changes expected in the near future, regardless of whether a consensus is reached to end the war in Gaza or whether significant shifts unfold in the West Bank.

Whether Abbas embraces reform or continues offering nominal adjustments without substance, the status quo, marked by a strategic tug-of-war with Hamas, demonstrates that the Palestinian Authority requires more than symbolic changes.

On the international front, the US administration remains unencumbered by Israeli pressure in its dealings. The recent involvement of Adam Boehler, the American envoy for hostage negotiations, affirms that Hamas is operating with strategic and tactical intent. In turn, the Palestinian Authority is grappling with the implications of Hamas’s influence, attempting to reassert its role as a legitimate international actor.

Yet, tensions between the Palestinian factions and the PA have rendered meaningful cooperation nearly impossible, especially given Israel’s strategic containment of the PA’s movements in the West Bank. This reality points to the potential need for either a transformation of the Palestinian Authority or its replacement with a more accountable body.

Still, Israel remains deeply concerned about a power vacuum should the current leadership collapse, wary of possible internal conflict, even as al-Sheikh begins to assume a more prominent role. This moment calls for deliberate preparation, as Israel appears intent on shaping the post-conflict landscape in both Gaza and the West Bank.

However, addressing these developments requires more than choosing a successor to Abbas. The issue is structural: a dysfunctional foundation of governance that Israel itself understands all too well. The broader political environment remains in flux, without a clearly defined path forward. This demands a flexible, pragmatic response that enables the PA to evolve and regain credibility.

The revival of Palestinian institutions depends on restoring their legitimacy, setting priorities, and rejecting internal narratives – especially from within Fatah – that claim elections are unfeasible under current conditions, a claim that, while understandable, cannot justify inaction.

What is needed is a comprehensive reimagining of institutional legitimacy, beginning with the Central Council and extending across the PLO’s organizational structure. This reform should be inclusive, but without becoming mired in the debate over formally integrating Hamas or Islamic Jihad – groups that currently show no interest in joining, due to their own agendas and strategic calculations.

Ultimately, using the excuse of the status quo to justify stagnation is untenable. Israel’s strategy of entrenching the current reality, including measures such as withholding tax and customs revenues and facilitating US aid cuts to PA institutions, reveals a broader campaign to weaken the Palestinian Authority. These tactics aim to dry up the PA’s financial resources and perpetuate its erosion on the ground, reinforcing the urgent need for transformative action rather than reactive maneuvering.

– Tarek Fahmy

(2)

WHEN WEAPONS BECOME AN IDEOLOGY

By Marwan El Amine

Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, May 2

Since its founding, Hezbollah has worked to redefine Shi’ite identity in Lebanon, shifting it from a national affiliation rooted in the Lebanese state to an ideological one aligned with Iran’s Guardianship of the Jurist doctrine. To advance this agenda, the group engaged in so-called “brotherly wars” aimed at consolidating control over the Shi’ite community and undermining the framework of national belonging established by Imam Musa al-Sadr.

In its formative years, Hezbollah pursued this control through two primary levers:

• religion and
• armed resistance

Yet, its efforts to impose the ideology of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ met with resistance that prevented it from fully embedding this doctrine within Lebanon’s Shi’ite population.

A major impediment was the historically deep-rooted and religiously significant connection between Lebanese Shi’ites and the traditional jurisprudential authorities of Najaf – figures like Muhsin al-Hakim, Abu al-Qasim Khoei, and later Ali al-Sistani  – who represent a school of thought that explicitly rejects Iran’s model of clerical rule and advocates for a separation between religious authority and direct governance.

Local independent religious authorities also stood as formidable barriers, especially the widely respected Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, and the enduring influence of Imam Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine, who continued al-Sadr’s mission of grounding the Shi’ite community in national Lebanese identity and emphasizing its integral role within the state rather than in opposition to it.

Together, these figures and institutions erected a bulwark against Hezbollah’s ideological infiltration of the Shi’ite sect. Confronted with the failure of its ideological project, Hezbollah pivoted to a more pragmatic and resonant strategy, embodied in the rhetoric of “resistance”. This narrative gained traction during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, when Hezbollah adopted the slogan “weapons to liberate the land” to secure political and popular legitimacy.

Yet, what began as a discourse of liberation evolved into an ideology of its own – one focused on the perpetual defense of the weapons themselves. In this transformation, the tools of resistance morphed into instruments of control, enabling Hezbollah to cultivate a sense of political and emotional detachment between the Shi’ite community and the Lebanese state, particularly in terms of loyalty and identity.

While the ideological project of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ failed to sever this connection, the ideology of weapons succeeded, recasting arms as the emblem of a unique identity and a symbol of unwavering allegiance to Tehran, the architect of this militarized vision. Within this framework, Hezbollah’s insistence on keeping its arms must be understood not merely as a strategic or tactical decision, but as the linchpin of its political and ideological existence.

To Hezbollah, these weapons are sacrosanct – not simply tools of defense or influence but the primary means by which it has alienated the Shi’ite community from the Lebanese state and erected a psychological and political divide that subordinates national loyalty to transnational allegiance. The arms serve as the last remaining tether connecting the Shi’ite community to Iran’s ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ project, with implications that reach far beyond Lebanon’s borders.

As such, the prospect of disarmament poses an existential threat to Hezbollah’s authority and simultaneously opens the door for the Shi’ite community to break free from the orbit of Iranian influence. Severing this link would not only undermine Hezbollah’s power but would effectively dismantle the ideological infrastructure of Iran’s presence in Lebanon.

Today, caught between the failure to impose the religious ideology of ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ doctrine and the severe blow dealt to the ideology of weapons by its military defeat in the recent war, the Iranian project in Lebanon stands precariously on the edge of decline.

– Marwan El Amine

(3)

BETWEEN THE PROTESTS IN GAZA AND TEL AVIV

By Tarek Fahmy

Al-Ittihad, UAE, April 5

It may seem like an imprecise comparison to juxtapose the ongoing protests in the Gaza Strip against Hamas’ continued rule – despite the massive destruction, thousands of Palestinian casualties, and a glaring absence of any credible path toward resolution – with the large-scale demonstrations unfolding in Israel, driven by demands for a hostage exchange and a ceasefire.

In Gaza, the internal vacuum surrounding the handover of hostages, the ambiguity over partial Israeli withdrawals and reconstruction efforts, and the vague proposals to restructure the security and political scene via a consensus committee between Fatah and Hamas, all amid responses to American and Israeli initiatives, reflect a paralyzed political landscape.

On the other side, Israel’s societal unrest is tightly linked to its internal political disarray, particularly the makeup of its governing coalition and its controversial maneuvers – including attempts to dismiss the Shin Bet chief and the attorney general, and the reinstallation of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir to enforce his aggressive security vision.

The core issue in both Gaza and Israel remains the same: a deep state of internal fragmentation and the absence of a coherent political roadmap.

In Gaza’s case, the situation is made even more complex by Israel’s persistent military strategy, which relies heavily on force, targeting critical infrastructure, resuming the policy of targeted assassinations against mid-level and internal security figures, and cutting off internet, water, and electricity in line with a broader plan seemingly intended to render the Strip uninhabitable and to encourage voluntary migration – a trend already underway. This approach appears designed to impose a new reality on all parties involved.

In Israel, the unrest demands serious internal introspection despite the government’s current hold on power. Public opinion is increasingly split between factions for and against the status quo, with growing concerns of an impending civil war should the situation persist. This internal division suggests Israel is unlikely to seriously engage in ceasefire negotiations until it achieves what it considers sufficient security and ensures that a repeat of October 7 is impossible.

This is further complicated by looming threats on the Lebanese front, where no solid guarantees exist, despite Hezbollah and Hamas’ setbacks and the current American-Israeli focus on neutralizing the Houthi front.

Within this complex web, the search for alternatives is gaining traction. In Gaza, this could mean the imposition of tribal leadership – an idea floated by Israel after months of conflict – or perhaps civilian, nonpartisan governance. These scenarios underscore Israel’s belief that Hamas is unlikely to relinquish control voluntarily and will continue to sacrifice lives to maintain its grip.

Any Hamas willingness to consider current proposals is seen in Israel as tactical rather than strategic, while in parallel, calls for early elections and an end to political polarization grow louder.

However, the political establishment in Israel remains relatively united around the vision of stability under Netanyahu’s leadership, bolstered by the backing of the religious establishment and senior rabbis who see the continuation of conflict not only as a negotiation tool but as a vehicle for a larger objective: the erasure of Palestinian presence.

Accordingly, the Israeli strategy in Gaza is likely to remain expansive, precluding any real or even temporary solution, particularly amid ongoing disunity between Hamas and Fatah and the absence of a robust Palestinian political alternative.

For a meaningful shift to occur, Palestinian public opinion must mobilize around a new paradigm, one that moves beyond factionalism and demands the revitalization of the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the broader political system to demonstrate to the international community a genuine commitment to reform rather than continued political maneuvering.

The protests now erupting in both Israel and Gaza are rooted in deeper realities that reflect the broader crisis engulfing both territories – realities that could profoundly shape the course of events, especially as multiple scenarios remain in play and the region teeters on the edge of new, unpredictable developments.

-Tarek Fahmy

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

What has significantly changed following Israel’s defensive response to Hezbollah’s missile war on Israel following Hamas’ October 7 massacre is that the now weakened Shia Islamist political party and paramilitary group is increasingly losing Arab media support and is now being perceived as more of a liability than an asset to the best interests of Lebanon.

See recent articles (below) in the Arab media addressing this issue below.

David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land

(*Articles below translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

(1)

THE HEZBOLLAH PARADOX

History does not move in reverse – especially not in war
By Jean Feghali 

Nidaa Al Watan, Lebanon, March 21

Hezbollah’s actions and rhetoric have become increasingly contradictory, particularly in the aftermath of its defeat by Israel. On one hand, it seeks to assert itself as the ultimate authority, acting as both the state and the dominant power, yet on the other, it scrambles for protection under the very state it undermines – having lost the political and strategic umbrellas it once relied on from its leadership structure to the Assad regime.

This contradiction is evident in its stance toward the Lebanese Army. It calls for the army’s presence in the town of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, yet the moment the army arrives, Hezbollah unleashes its loyalists to hurl insults, level accusations, and brand army officers and soldiers as “agents” and “Zionists”.

What exactly does Hezbollah want? In practical terms, it wants to revert to the status quo before October 8, 2023, when it launched its operation against Israel. But history does not move in reverse – especially not in war. The reality on the ground has changed entirely.

Hezbollah has suffered devastating losses, including two of its top leaders, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, along with over 30 of its highest-ranking field commanders and more than 120 mid-level field officers. Hundreds of others have been rendered unfit for service, and it has lost much of its military infrastructure south of the Litani River, including key tunnel networks and ammunition depots.

Externally, the situation is just as dire. Hezbollah has lost what was once its greatest strategic asset: the Syrian lever. With the fall of the Assad regime, it no longer enjoys the logistical and territorial depth that allowed it to operate with impunity. Forced to retreat into Lebanon’s borders, it has attempted to revive its long-standing mantra of “the people, the army, and the resistance.”

But this is where the contradiction deepens: How can it cling to this formula while simultaneously discrediting one of its supposed pillars – the Lebanese Army? The party’s own loyalists have accused the army’s officers and soldiers of treason, labeling them “Zionist agents,” effectively dismantling the very equation Hezbollah seeks to uphold. What remains is an absurd inversion: “the people, the Zionists, and the resistance.”

Hezbollah is now ensnared in its own rhetoric – demanding the army’s protection while actively eroding its legitimacy. Simply repeating the claim of “embracing the army” is no longer enough. If Hezbollah truly seeks legitimacy, it must do more than just pay lip service to the idea of national unity; it must accept the reality that the Lebanese Army alone has the rightful monopoly on weapons.

Until Hezbollah reaches this level of acknowledgment, the rhetoric of its officials – including the latest remarks by MP Hussein Hajj Hassan – is nothing more than a smokescreen, an attempt to obscure the fundamental contradiction of a movement that, on one hand, demands the army’s support, while on the other, denounces it as a traitor.

The real test for Hezbollah is whether it can confront this paradox – or whether it will continue to evade the inevitable reckoning with Lebanon’s sovereignty.

-Jean Feghali 

(2)

HEZBOLLAH SEVERS OUTSTRECHED HAND

Rather than reflecting on its ruinous past, Hezbollah choses delusion brandishing threats to manipulate public fear.
By Assaad Bechara

Nidaz Al Watan, Lebanon, April 17

An extended hand is met with severance – this is Hezbollah’s enduring equation, a principle it has embedded into its conduct for decades.

Dialog, in Hezbollah’s view, is never a pathway to mutual understanding but a tactical maneuver. Partnership is not a framework for cooperation but a platform for domination. 

In Hezbollah’s lexicon, any initiative toward reconciliation is rebranded as a conspiracy that must be crushed – either through force or political subversion.

In 2006, national dialogue among political factions was swiftly followed by catastrophe, as Hezbollah unilaterally abducted Israeli soldiers, dragging the country into a devastating war that destroyed infrastructure and spilled innocent blood, bypassing all legitimate state authority.

When Hezbollah joined the government and refused to honor its agreements, the May 7 clashes of Beirut and Mount Lebanon erupted – a violent episode burned into national memory. The Baabda Declaration, forged at president Michel Suleiman’s dialogue table, was barely dry before Hezbollah disavowed it, treating it as though it had never existed.

Today, President Joseph Aoun extends his hand under enormous strain, facing both international and domestic pressure to confront the illegal presence of arms in Lebanon. 

His goal is to safeguard Lebanon’s military institution and uphold civil peace. Hezbollah’s response: not political dissent or legal argument, but overt threats to sever his hand – a discourse alien to democratic societies, steeped instead in fascist overtones that ignore the nation’s painful history.

Rather than reflect on its ruinous past, Hezbollah chooses escapism, brandishing the threat of chaos to manipulate public fear, whipping its supporters into frenzies of rhetoric and deflection. Meanwhile, Israel continues to escalate its warnings, emboldened by shifting power dynamics that expose Hezbollah’s so-called deterrence as a crumbling myth.

On the domestic front, Hezbollah no longer hides that its weapons are not Lebanon’s shield, but a lever for foreign agendas and a tool for internal coercion. 

It is a party that does not seek common ground because it is nourished by discord and ruin. 

In Hezbollah’s worldview, anyone who dares to build a state is not a partner but a traitor – someone whose outstretched hand deserves to be cut off. Unless the Lebanese people rise to reject this doctrine of sabotage and repression, the state will remain shackled, and the metaphor of severed hands will remain a grim rule imposed on any effort at national rescue.

– Assaad Bechara

(3)

INTERGRATING HEZBOLLAH INTO LEBANESE ARMY?

How can Hezbollah fighters be transformed from ideological foot soldiers of the mullahs into disciplined military personnel who accept orders only from the Lebanese chain of command?
By Riad Kahwaji

An-Nahar, Lebanon, April 18

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun recently announced his intention to lead a direct dialogue with Hezbollah’s leadership regarding the transfer of its weapons to legitimate state authorities. He also expressed support for the integration of Hezbollah members into the national military establishment – not as an autonomous resistance force akin to the Popular Mobilization Forces, but as part of the state’s official defense apparatus. This initiative is a key component of President Aoun’s broader efforts to resolve the ongoing dilemma of Hezbollah’s weapons, which continues to obstruct reconstruction efforts and delay the flow of international aid.

Reports suggest that the Lebanese army has already quietly begun collecting weapons from certain Hezbollah sites, out of the public eye in order to avoid political embarrassment. However, the issue of integrating Hezbollah members into the armed forces poses a significant and complex challenge, both domestically and internationally – one that may not have been fully anticipated by the president’s advisory team and must be urgently addressed.

The Lebanese army has a relatively successful track record in absorbing former militia members following the civil war and the implementation of the Taif Agreement in the early 1990s. 

At that time, Hezbollah’s weapons were exempted due to regional arrangements brokered by the late Syrian president Hafez Assad, under the justification that they were necessary for resisting the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon.

The militias that were integrated into the army at the time were secular in nature, with nationalist leanings on both the Right and Left. Their fighters underwent training focused on discipline, adherence to military hierarchy, and alignment with the Lebanese army’s doctrine. 

Hezbollah, however, is fundamentally different. It is an ideological party rooted in armed Shi’ite political Islam, established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) as part of a broader regional project that has extended far beyond Lebanon’s borders over the past four decades.

Many of Hezbollah’s youth have been raised from childhood in party-run institutions, indoctrinated with loyalty to the supreme leader of Iran. These cadres have played a key role in militarizing Shi’ite movements across the Arab world, particularly since 2004.

The use of religious doctrine to justify violence within Shi’ite political Islam is not fundamentally different from its Sunni counterpart. Both rely on religious rulings and fatwas issued by clerical authorities deemed legitimate by their respective movements. 

In Sunni jihadist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS, fighters pledge allegiance to an emir or religious figure who sanctions acts of violence, including suicide bombings, promising divine reward. 

Hezbollah’s system is more structured but mirrors the same ideological framework. What are locally known as “religious mandates” are issued to fighters, defining their mission and assuring martyrdom status in the event of death.

Hezbollah’s leaders have openly acknowledged their allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader and their organic ties to the IRGC. Militant political Islam – whether Sunni or Shi’ite – rejects national borders in favor of transnational religious unity, with ultimate objectives such as reestablishing the caliphate or expanding the Islamic nation according to each sect’s interpretation.

Globally, there is no precedent for rehabilitating and integrating members of armed ideological Islamist groups into a national army, particularly in a country like Lebanon, which has endured decades of sectarian strife. 

Has the Lebanese army command developed a concrete plan for such integration? 

How can young Hezbollah members be transformed from ideological foot soldiers of the mullahs into disciplined military personnel who accept orders only from the Lebanese chain of command, without deference to external religious authorities? 

Will Lebanese Shi’ite clerics be recruited to support this transformation?

Since 2001, as part of the global war on terror and the emergence of al-Qaida and later ISIS, Western and Arab states have focused on confronting armed Sunni political Islam. The Lebanese army has engaged in multiple confrontations with Sunni militant groups in Tripoli, Sidon, and the outskirts of Arsal. 

These groups were defeated, many of their members imprisoned, and Lebanon’s security services continue to monitor and detain suspects affiliated with them – hundreds remain incarcerated without trial. 

How, then, can Sunni political Islamists in Lebanon justify the inclusion of Hezbollah members in the same army that has persecuted them for decades? This question is particularly sensitive in Lebanon’s sectarian political system and must not be overlooked.

Furthermore, the new Syrian regime and its military forces are themselves born of Sunni political Islam, raising the potential for future complications if Hezbollah fighters are absorbed into the Lebanese army. 

Most Arab countries – and especially the Gulf states – have rejected both Sunni and Shi’ite manifestations of armed political Islam. 

Even Western powers that once cooperated with Shi’ite militias now classify many of them, including Hezbollah, as terrorist organizations and are actively working to dismantle their influence as part of broader efforts to contain Iran’s regional reach. Therefore, despite the good intentions and theoretical appeal of integrating Hezbollah’s armed wing into the Lebanese military, the initiative carries significant risks and red flags that must be taken seriously to prevent future instability.

 – Riad Kahwaji

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

Wednesday last week marked the 46 years since the Egypt–Israel peace treaty was signed in Washington, DC, between then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin and then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, making Egypt the first Arab country to officially recognize Israel. Despite the peace treaty holding – and that it also marked Egypt as the first Arab country to officially recognize Israel – it was unmentioned and most likely, intentionally ignored in the Egyptian press. Clearly, with the peace treaty remaining so unpopular with the Egyptian public, the local Egyptian media avoided it like the ‘plague’ – no inference to upcoming Passover!

Instead, what was reported relating to Egyptian-Israeli relations was that Israel’s newly appointed ambassador to Egypt, Ori Rotman, was disinvited from the accreditation ceremony last week, where he would have presented his credentials to Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi.

Sisi received the credentials of 23 new ambassadors at the Heliopolis Palace in Cairo. Israel’s ambassador should have made it 24, and in an Al-Araby report, it was made clear that the “disinvite” was due to the “ongoing aggression in the Gaza Strip,” as well as Egypt holding Israel responsible “of breaching the agreement reached with Egyptian and Qatari mediators.” 

This should not have come as a surprise. As Yaakov Katz in an opinion piece in The Jerusalem Post explained, that Egypt’s “diplomatic freeze did not occur in a vacuum.” He drew attention to a recent study by the Glazer Foundation Information and Consulting Center at the Jewish People Policy Institute that reviewed thousands of opinion pieces published in two of Egypt’s most influential newspapers: Al-Ahram, the country’s most widely read paper, and Al-Gomhuria, a state-owned publication once edited by none other than Egypt’s late president and signatory of the Camp David peace agreement, Anwar Sadat.

“The findings are sobering,” writes Katz. “Of the articles that mentioned Israel, over 85% were negative, with many veering into outright antisemitism. These weren’t simply political critiques; some employed classic antisemitic tropes: claims about Jews loving money, being disloyal, or Judaism being a “fake” religion founded on myths.”

Up against Egypt’s media mindset, the focus on Israel is expected to be only in the negative.

It was illuminating to read how Arab media covered – if they did at all – the protests in Gaza against Hamas. Hundreds of Palestinians bravely took to the streets in northern Gaza in defiance of Hamas to demand an end to war and the immediate release of Israeli hostages – not as a concern for the hostages – but as a means to put an end to the cause of their misery as a consequence of the war. Noting little to no concern for Israelis by Gazan protesters other than their own suffering, Cookie Schwaeber-Issan asks in ‘Have Gazans finally seen the light? (JP March 18)  :

“What about the hostage families who have lost all that was dear to them? Add to that the parents, wives, siblings, and children of the dead Israeli soldiers whose young lives were extinguished in the service of their country. And what about Diaspora Jews who were harassed, threatened, and derided just for having been born into an ethnicity that, overnight, became synonymous with hated members of society?”

While it’s gratifying to see Gazans finally identifying the true villains, it would be encouraging to see that extend to the misery inflicted by these same “villains” on Israelis. It’s unlikely for the foreseeable future.

See below and article by London-based Palestinian political analyst Ahmed Najar who writes that although “Some Arab media… have downplayed the recent protests, calling them isolated incidents or ignoring them altogether,” nevertheless, fails to mentions once the Israeli hostages, the pain, misery inflicted on Israelis by a war started by Gazans. The focus of his narrative is: “The people of Gaza cannot take this genocide anymore.”

With such reportage and accusations in the Arab media, is it ever likely that there will be an honest reckoning, particularly in Palestinian society, of what took place on October 7 and who the real criminals are?

David E. Kaplan
Editor, Lay of the Land
30 March, 2025

PALISTINIANS ARE PLEADING FOR AN END TO THE GAZA WAR. NO ONE IS LISTENING
By Ahmed Najar

Published on 27 March 2025 in Middle East Eye, a news platform covering the Middle East and North Africa.

Protesters are calling on both Israel and Hamas to relieve their misery, while the media only amplifies whatever angle suits its narrative.

The people of Gaza are revolting against their killing and starvation. In the north, the streets are packed with desperate voices chanting: “We want to live! End the Israeli killing! We are peaceful people! Out, out, out! Hamas, out!” 

My social media has been flooded with videos of these demonstrations by people who have lost everything, who are starving, who just want the killing to end.

Western media, of course, have amplified this, reporting it as a major event. I just wish they had shown the same urgency when thousands of Palestinians were being slaughtered. 

Our deaths were barely a footnote. When Israeli bombs reduced homes to rubble, with entire families buried under the debris, there were no breaking news alerts, no in-depth analyses, no panel discussions dissecting the scale of Palestinian suffering. 

Our deaths came and went in a single line of text at the bottom of the screen – cold, distant and insignificant. 

Some Arab media, meanwhile, have downplayed the recent protests, calling them isolated incidents or ignoring them altogether.

But no one is asking why people are out on the streets. No one is acknowledging their desperation, their unbearable grief. These are not people playing politics; these are people who have lost their families, their homes and their futures. They are starving. They are broken. And they are willing to pay any price just to make it stop.

How much pain must a person endure before they stop fearing bullets in the hands of the powerful? How much hunger must a child feel before their parents are willing to stand in front of guns and demand that something – anything – change?

I have heard from people in Gaza who have lost their parents, children and siblings. Still, through their devastation, they say: “I accept it, just let the war end.”

When my nephew Fouad was killed, I called my mother. Through her pain, she simply said: “May God bless his soul. We accept what has been written for us. But let the killing stop. I hope we lose no more.”

There was a deep, quiet grief in those words – a grief that has learned not to scream, because screaming does nothing. A grief that is tired of waiting for the world to notice.

The people of Gaza cannot take this genocide anymore. They understand now, more than ever, what kind of world they live in. It is a world where they are just numbers; where their lives mean nothing. They know that Israel has been given free rein to kill as many of them as possible, and that they are trapped in a brutal game of regional and political calculations.

They know that their suffering is useful to some, inconvenient to others, and irrelevant to most.

They see Israel carrying out its greed-driven, genocidal agenda.

One protester told CNN: “Our message is to the Israeli army to stop the bloodshed and the war that has drained our energy and caused us to lose all our loved ones and friends.”

There is something deeply tragic in these words, in how Palestinians – my people – have been reduced to figures in a brutal equation. And yet, the world only listens when it suits them.

Suffering in silence

No one wants to hear what the people of Gaza actually want. The anti-Hamas voices in the West only amplify their suffering when it serves their agenda. They were silent when Gaza was screaming in agony, in mourning, in starvation. 

They want to use our voices when we chant against Hamas, but they mute us when we cry out for our murdered families. They never want to hear us demand an end to Israel’s slaughter.

On the other side, some voices dismiss this suffering. They act as though these protests are nothing; as if people risking their lives to demand an end to this nightmare are somehow irrelevant. Their voices, too, have only ever amplified what suits them.

And in the end, no one cares.

No one has pointed out that not all of Gaza is Hamas, that not all of Gaza is fighting. Israeli politicians once justified their mass killings by claiming otherwise. They have spent years conditioning the world to believe that Gaza is nothing but Hamas, that every Palestinian in Gaza is part of some vast, faceless enemy.

But if that were true, then why are these same civilians now in the streets, demanding peace? Why are they risking their lives to demand an end to this war?

And why is Israel still starving them? Why is Israel still bombing them?

If they are not Hamas, if they are civilians, if they are now standing in the open, asking for nothing but survival – why is the world still watching them die in silence?

The truth is in their slogan, in their plea: “We want to live.”

Ahmed Najar is a Palestinian political analyst and a playwright based in London.

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

In our latest newsletter,we focus on Arab writers addressing three major issues confronting the Middle East:

• The realization and acknowledgement that any serious pursuit to resuscitate Lebanon politically and economically requires uprooting the “malignant tumor” of corruption
• Iran’s dilemma as it faces down the dangers of whether  to talk or not to talk to the new US administration
• The impact of Zelensky’s tempestuous meeting with Trump might have on the Middle East

While to outside observers, these issues may be little more of than of academic or intellectual interest, however to the countries affected, the impacts could prove  existential.

David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land

(*Articles translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

CORRUPTION,CORRUPTION,CORRUPTION
Lebanon is not bankrupt but a plundered state
By Jean Feghali 

Nidaa Al-Watan, Lebanon, Feb. 21

There is a malignant tumor that transcends eras, decades, and even centuries. Its diagnosis is not difficult. It is called corruption. Lebanon has been plagued by it since the days of the Ottoman Empire, through the French mandate, and into the era of independence. It festered during the Civil War, endured through the post-war period, and continued even with the advent of peace. To this day, it continues to erode the fabric of the Lebanese state. 

President General Joseph Aoun recently stated:

 “My main concern is to combat corruption that has eaten away at state administrations and has become a culture, and this corruption can only be stopped through accountability. Lebanon is not bankrupt but rather a plundered state ruled by people who have mismanaged its resources. Things will not be put right except by combating corruption and the corrupt.” 

There are several key points to address here: corruption has become a culture in Lebanon; it can only be stopped through accountability, and Lebanon is a looted country governed by those who have squandered its resources. These three observations form the foundation of a roadmap for combating corruption – one that is not merely aimed at combating corruption for its own sake but with the ultimate goal of recovering the stolen funds, as the president emphasizes: “Lebanon is looted, not bankrupt.” 

This road map requires a clear mechanism, and it is not beyond reach. The first step is identifying where the “looted money” went – specifically, how debts were paid off with checks and who the key beneficiaries are, particularly the larger figures involved. This is the latest innovation in corruption: allowing the major beneficiaries who took out loans to pay them off with checks at the lowest possible rates, with depositors’ funds at stake. It would be enough to file a lawsuit against these individuals, forcing the disclosure of their accounts, and once the recovery process begins, the financial gap would begin to narrow. 

The second crucial issue is tax evasion. Today, the situation is more manageable than it once was, but it requires a decisive political will and a commitment to execution. For these matters to reach a resolution, they must be handed to an impartial judiciary – one that is not intimidated by the powerful and does not prey on the weak.

Perhaps the most accurate assessment of the judicial system was made by President Aoun, who, during a meeting with the Press Club, offered a candid observation:

“There is no judiciary in Lebanon.”

This stark truth – acknowledged by virtually everyone in Lebanon – is the starting point for any serious effort to combat corruption. 

In a country where the corrupt do not fear its judiciary, corruption will continue unchecked. Only when the judiciary operates with integrity, free from intimidation or political influence, will Lebanon begin to see meaningful progress in fighting the pervasive corruption that continues to plague it.
– Jean Feghali 

IRAN:TO TALK OR NOT TALK…THAT IS THE QUESTION
By Amir Taheri

Asharq Al-Awsat, London, Feb. 21

With the Trump administration sending mixed signals about its intentions toward Iran, the country’s leadership is once again divided over how to respond. 

One faction is painting a grim picture in which the US provides Israel with enough support to deliver a crushing blow to Iran, completing the defeats already inflicted on Tehran’s allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. These defeats, the faction argues, would inspire opponents of the regime, both within and outside the country, to take to the streets and seize power, while the IRGC, suffering from low morale, would resort to what it did in Syria – fleeing under the economic crisis’s shadow to protect itself. 

This faction contends that the current economic crisis has drained the will and energy of the regime’s dwindling support base, making regime change a real possibility for the first time.

So, how can such a perilous situation be navigated? Senior figures in this faction, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, are proposing to open talks aimed at preventing war and allowing for a cooling of tensions. But who should they talk to? Talking to the US is supposedly off-limits, according to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who cites a fatwa issued by the regime’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as well as a law passed by the Islamic Majlis, Iran’s parliament, which enforces the ban. 

The answer: the European trio of France, Germany, and Great Britain, which just so happens to have strained relations with Washington at the moment. The theory is that the three countries would welcome a diplomatic breakthrough to restore some of the prestige they lost after President Donald Trump excluded them from his Ukraine peace initiative and his plans for the future of Gaza. 

But what could be discussed without having to make concessions that would lead to a massive loss of face? The proposed “talks” would involve Iran offering to freeze its nuclear program for two to three years, after which it would decide its next steps. Tehran is currently investing vast resources in a program that lacks a clear and justifiable civilian or military purpose. 

In return, the EU trio would use the mechanism provided by UN Security Council Resolution 3221 to block any military action against Iran. That resolution expires in October, opening the door to unintended consequences. Reaching an agreement with the Europeans would help ease pressure on Iran, inject some life into its moribund economy, and help prevent a widespread popular uprising. 

Those promoting this analysis assume that the US and Israel will simply stand by and watch as Iran recovers from the brink. This analysis is countered by the faction loyal to the Supreme Leader, who insists that any appearance of weakness will accelerate the process of regime change. His advice is to stand firm and prepare for war. 

The first step, according to this faction, is to build a war fund. This is achieved by reducing the supply of foreign currency in the market, allowing the national currency to depreciate further. The Iranian rial, which was worth 650,000 to the dollar, now needs to fall to 900,000 to the dollar. This was a trick used by the Allies when they invaded and occupied Iran during World War II. Because their expenses in Iran were in local currency, they were forced to devalue the rial by 50%. 

Now, the Iranian regime is using this same tactic to increase the state’s purchasing power while reducing that of Iranian families, including military personnel and civil servants. To partially compensate, key individuals needed for the war effort are being given exceptional bonuses. The Supreme Leader, who controls the forces of law and order, has placed them on partial alert to preempt any potential rebellion. This is accompanied by a widespread crackdown on potential opponents, particularly in Tehran, where reports of arbitrary arrests have surfaced. 

All of this suggests that the head of the Iranian regime is not willing to accept another deal with America in order to distance himself voluntarily from Trump’s four-year term – a game that has led seven consecutive American presidents to a dead end and allowed the Islamic Republic to approach its golden jubilee. 

Today, the question of whether to talk or not to talk is not just a matter for rival factions in Tehran but also for those forces that – rightly or wrongly – have concluded that there can be no regional peace and stability without persuading or forcing what former French president François Mitterrand called “the great troublemaker” to change or be changed.
– Amir Taheri

ZELENSKY’S WHITE HOUSE ‘TRAP’ SENDS DANGEROUS WORLD MESSAGE
By Eyad Abu Shakra

Asharq Al-Awsat, London, March 2

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent controversial meeting at the White House has generated a plethora of images and quotes, not to mention conspiracy theories. This encounter sent a resounding message to the world, offering a stark lesson for those still bound by outdated perceptions of US President Donald Trump’s thinking, his value system, his understanding of political mechanisms, his definitions of enemies and allies, and his respect for institutions, traditions, and historical relationships.

What the cameras and microphones captured seemed more akin to a “trap” laid by the Trump administration for the Ukrainian leader than a sincere political dialogue between allies, irrespective of their size. Although Zelensky probably anticipated that today’s Washington is not the same as yesterday’s, I doubt he expected to face a firing squad as he did in reality.

It is well documented that most American commitments to Ukraine were solidified during the Democratic administrations since 2014, including the terms of Barack Obama (2009-2017) and Joe Biden (2021-2025), encompassing Trump’s initial term (2017-2021). 

What has been confirmed, whether during Trump’s years in office, through his campaign slogans, or his media statements, is that his mold is not only distinct from his Democratic predecessors but also from a significant portion of American presidents and leaders post-World War II in 1945.

One might argue that Trump possesses an independent mind that enables him to think outside the box. Others might assert that times have changed, along with the concepts and political dangers, necessitating a new approach that liberates from the constraints of inherited alliances and considerations that have traditionally restricted presidential actions and limited maneuverability.

This reality has even recently reflected the coexistence of two “schools” of conservative thought that have increasingly influenced the Republican Party, at least since the early 20th century. The party has historically housed right-wing and center-right currents, as well as centrist and progressive elements.

A retrospective glance at a few notable figures from the 20th and 21st centuries within the party’s ranks reveals hardline conservative right-wingers like senators Robert Taft and Joseph McCarthy, presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, governor and president Ronald Reagan, and then governor and president George W. Bush. 

They rose to prominence in the Republican and American political arena before the Trump era, influenced by extremist phenomena such as McCarthyism, the clash with the East, and the moral majority representing evangelical Christianity, followed by neoconservatives, a coalition of the Christian religious right, the Jewish lobby, and the arms lobby.

Alongside these were the realist and center-right currents, exemplified by figures like President Dwight Eisenhower, presidents Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush, and political leaders like Thomas Dewey, Robert Dole, John McCain, and Mitt Romney. Prominent liberal and progressive centrists historically included president Theodore Roosevelt (considered leftist by today’s standards), and statesmen like vice president Nelson Rockefeller, Jacob Javits, Charles Percy, John Chafee (former secretary of the Navy), and James Jeffords.

The pluralism once evident within the Republican Party seems absent in Donald Trump’s second term. Indeed, the previously mentioned extremist elements, despite their fervor, appeared more adherent to democratic foundations, institutions, and traditions, guided by the principle of separation of powers and more accepting of coexistence with opposing views.

Despite their intensity, these movements were less prone to “deification” compared to the MAGA phenomenon, which we’re seeing not only with the populist political base of President Trump. The MAGA movement, with Trump at its helm, disregards the separation of powers, the peaceful transition of power, and the independence of the judiciary, and refuses to acknowledge any election outcome unfavorable to its candidate. To achieve its goals, it did not hesitate to storm the Capitol building in Washington – the sacrosanct symbol of American democratic legitimacy.

Domestically, what remains of the New Deal, initiated in the 1930s following the Great Depression to provide a safety net for the American citizen, is currently being dismantled in cooperation with unelected billionaires. On the international front, all traditional prohibitions have been lifted; the erstwhile enemy has become a friend, the ally an irritating economic rival; and the territories of “neighbors” have turned into alluring, loose spaces open for annexation, occupation, and enforced acquisition, or regions from which undesirable inhabitants must be isolated behind walls of separation.

The entire political culture Washington inherited from the Cold War era has collapsed, with the notable exception of unwavering alignment with the ambitions of the Israeli far-right settler movement.

The distressing and profoundly detrimental signal sent by Washington, under Donald Trump, to the world, through the demeaning treatment of President Zelensky, signals that there is no longer peace of mind for Washington’s allies in the Far East and Western Europe, no vision for a stable and viable Middle East, no South Asia safe from nuclear calamities, and no South America free from the emergence of reckless populist regimes that fail to learn or be deterred.
– Eyad Abu Shakra

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

In the wake of monumental fallout of Israel’s impactful wars against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Arab media scrambles with uncertainty to decipher how the future Middle East political landscape may evolve. Confounding their instigative coverage is the ‘Trump factor’  – the new US president whose power and personality has regional political leaders perplexed and wondering:
‘What, where and when?’

David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land

*(Articles translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

PRESIDENT TRUMP AND THE GULF

By Abdullah Bishara

Al Qabas, Kuwait, February 12

President Trump has returned to the presidency of the United States, buoyed by an unforeseen landslide victory that has propelled him back into the White House. His success has left him intoxicated with triumph and armed with an agenda filled with ambitious plans that encompass both the feasible and the challenging. Undeniably, his extensive ambitions have been fueled by the overwhelming victory granted to him by the American electorate, which surpassed all projections.

This substantial victory has certainly triggered concerns within the global community, particularly given President Trump’s unconventional approach. He eschews traditional logic and norms, addressing international issues with convictions that shape the ideas and solutions he proposes. President Trump does not adhere to conventional problem-solving mechanisms. He exists in his own realm, dismissing analyses, the quality of advice, or the obviousness of logic and rationality, guided by a subjective belief in his capacity to unravel mysteries, surmount obstacles, and fill gaps. This confidence is bolstered by the formidable power wielded by the United States across various domains.

Furthermore, he introduces proposals to both allies and adversaries, proposals that frequently conflict with his role as a neutral mediator. He steadfastly maintains positions as remedies for the issues he negotiates, often with little regard for their legitimacy or legality. He remains determined to reduce the burdens shouldered by the United States in maintaining global stability, a stance that has raised apprehensions in Europe, NATO, and among allies in Asia.

Turning his focus to the Israeli-Arab conflict, he devises intricate solutions he deems viable, relying on American strength and his entrenched personal convictions. In his perspective, the endorsements from Bahrain, the Emirates, Sudan, and Morocco in the Abraham Initiatives validate his approach. Now, once again, he is resolute in advancing his role to secure an acceptable resolution with Israel and nations like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and the remaining Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

President Trump undoubtedly senses that the present conditions offer a unique context for peaceful resolutions, distinct from prior attempts, granting a greater prospect of success. Multiple factors contribute to his optimism.

First: The Trump administration has undoubtedly monitored substantial transformations within the Arab world. The Assad regime in Syria has vanished, succeeded by a new administration open to initiatives that untangle the complexities inherited from its predecessor. Iraq has also undergone shifts in its political landscape concerning regional matters, fostering an adaptive environment in line with the peace efforts championed by President Trump. No significant opposition exists in the region to the pursuit of an agreeable resolution to the Palestinian issue.

Second: Events in recent months, particularly the Israeli offensive on Gaza, its targeting of Hamas, and its elimination of Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon, have influenced regional dynamics.

Third: Israel has successfully neutralized the Iranian military presence in Syria, losing its key ally following the disappearance of the Assad regime and paving the way for moderate forces to align with the broader regional trend. As the Iranian presence dwindles in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, the prospects for peace solutions acceptable to Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq have heightened.

Fourth: President Trump is evidently focusing his aspirations on Saudi Arabia’s potential involvement in the Abraham Initiative. However, he must recognize the kingdom’s rationale for abstaining. Saudi Arabia has put forth a comprehensive proposal advocating the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for collective recognition of Israel. This stance reflects the broader Arab position. Without a Palestinian state, the region will continue to grapple with instability, turmoil, extremist proliferation, and mounting terrorism.

Fifth: Emphasizing the role of the GCC countries in global security and economic stability, these nations shoulder the responsibility of supplying essential energy at reasonable prices. Their diplomacy is rooted in their understanding of their pivotal role in the global economy, a commodity the world cannot forego without incurring chaos and peace erosion. The GCC states also actively engage in global development efforts, championing economic, social, and educational initiatives in developing countries, reflecting their commitment to advancing collective goals.

Sixth: Persistent skepticism among Arab states, including the Gulf, surrounds President Trump’s commitment to the principles necessary for easing tensions in the occupied Palestinian territories. His position, marked by strong support for Israel, including endorsing the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, remains indifferent to the objections from Arabs and others advocating for a balanced solution. Confidence in his support for Security Council resolutions and their implementation remains elusive.

Seventh: The transformation in the Arab region presently has reshaped the context of America’s involvement, witnessing increased engagement compared to Trump’s first presidency four years ago. Gulf-American relations have expanded and evolved from a phase of strength to one of strategic partnership, a reality President Trump is likely to leverage in pursuit of his objectives.

Eighth: For President Trump to succeed in his peace endeavors, he must focus his efforts on persuading Israel to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Without a state that embodies Palestinian aspirations, peace will remain elusive, posing significant challenges to all initiatives. The absence of a Palestinian state continues to pose a formidable barrier, demanding renewed, earnest efforts to actualize the Palestinian people’s right to statehood.

Ninth: President Trump stands to achieve success if he recognizes the imperative of establishing a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank. Conversely, ignoring this necessity would undermine his prospects for resolution.

Abdullah Bishara

TRUMPISM: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

Asharq Al-Awsat, London, February 6

Many assert that the words of Donald Trump, the returning American president, are mere bluster. In my view, Trump could be anything – either an empty sound bomb or a truly destructive force. 

We are on the brink of four potentially extraordinary years that could either morph into our worst fears, leaving Palestinians without a land, or realize the dream of a Palestinian state. His policies might ignite a dangerous regional war with Iran or herald a new era of regional peace, putting an end to decades of Arab-Western conflicts and tensions with Iran. He could either catalyze regime falls and ensuing chaos or foster security and peace regionwide.

This is not an overstatement – Trump is undeniably unpredictable. Whether joking or serious, he cannot be ignored. Not even 100 days into his new tenure, he has already dismissed the FBI director, disrupted the US Agency for International Development’s operations, fired 10,000 of its employees, halted all American aid globally, withdrawn from the World Health Organization, and initiated the mass deportation of illegal immigrants, with military planes carrying them out of the US at an unprecedented pace. This has forced several Latin American presidents to accommodate them. 

The Canadian prime minister has also scrambled to deploy about a quarter of a million soldiers and border guards to curb infiltration and smuggling, just as Mexico has done. Meanwhile, meetings are underway in Brussels, the European Union’s capital, to deliberate over Trump’s intentions to cut support for Ukraine and hike tariffs on European products.

If such actions don’t illustrate Trump’s character and management style, what lies ahead may be even more profound. Before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, Trump lifted restrictions on the sale of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel – restrictions imposed by his predecessor, president Joe Biden – and announced measures aimed at preventing Iran from exporting its oil. 

As we come to understand this American president, now more formidable than before, it’s essential to assess the issues he will address. Refusing to engage with him carries steep costs, and despite Trump’s repeated assurances of not resorting to military force against opponents, he can still inflict economic harm on those who dissent. 

Trump wields two key weapons. The first is economic and financial. This includes raising tariffs – though fortunately, Arab exports to the US are minimal – or cutting aid. Arab nations receiving aid need to reorganize their affairs if they plan on noncooperation and should not expect alternative support from other Arab nations or international allies, as Trump is likely to penalize governments and international banks that back dissenting regimes against him. 

The second weapon is political. Conflicts with Trump will be exploited by opposition forces like the Muslim Brotherhood, seeking to capitalize on the political climate. They will aim to incite public dissent against Trump and embarrass Arab governments with propaganda campaigns, while simultaneously maneuvering closer to the Trump administration for their own goals, much like their strategy in 2011.

The Trump administration faces two significant challenges: Iran and Palestine, with related crises branching out to include Yemen’s Houthi rebels, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Should Israel resolve to obliterate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, it must wait until Trump’s negotiation attempts – likely to commence soon – fail. 

It wouldn’t be inconceivable for the Iranian leadership to cooperate with Trump, given the Islamic Republic’s substantial losses having seen its external power diminished by over half following the destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah capabilities and the downfall of the Assad regime.

The threat is compounded by Trump’s decision to reimpose the oil embargo on Iran and possibly upping the ante with the threat of an Israeli strike on its nuclear infrastructure, risking Iran’s loss of crucial negotiating leverage. 

Of urgent concern is Trump’s project to depopulate Gaza, with more significant challenges anticipated.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

THE EXTENDED HAND HASN’T BEEN RECIPROCATED

By Marwan El Amine

Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, February 6

Following the steep cost Hezbollah bore in its recent war with Israel, alongside shifts in power dynamics and the emergence of regional and international dynamics that paved the way for the election of Joseph Aoun as president of the republic, the Lebanese people have the potential to unify. 

Aoun’s inauguration speech underscored a pivot toward national commonalities. This address urged unity under the constitution’s umbrella and within a framework of state institutions, emphasizing that any loss suffered by one party affects all. In line with this, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s inauguration speech highlighted an “outstretched hand” approach, signaling a new political era rooted in partnership and understanding, which bolsters a holistic national interest.

However, this gesture of cooperation found no reciprocal response; instead, it faced a slew of actions, indicating a continued dominance and imposition mindset. Among these actions:

Firstly, the opposition attempted to mandate the reappointment of Prime Minister Najib Mikati. When this failed, MP Mohammad Raad issued a statement affirming the persisting use of threats and arrogance, marked by boycotting consultations with the prime minister-designate, a blatant departure from established principles and norms. 

Secondly, there was a steadfast insistence on controlling the Finance Ministry, earmarking it for a candidate loyal to the opposition, sending a clear message that governance will continue under their sway, prioritizing their choices over the designated president and republic’s head, without regard for partnership and consensus principles. 

Thirdly, given Hezbollah’s restricted capacity for military maneuvers south of the Litani River due to possible military repercussions, the group incited the so-called “residents” of the region to stage popular movements, placing the Lebanese army in a precarious position. This was a stark reminder to concerned parties that the group remains at the helm of southern security matters, either through its militias or resident mobilization, aiming to undermine state authority and weaken the army’s role. 

Fourthly, beyond southern movements, Hezbollah orchestrated a provocative sectarian parade through Beirut’s streets, reinforcing its bullying approach and its posture of imposing its will on other community segments. This intimidating behavior mirrors itself in the gunfire salutes at member funerals, which starkly undermine state authority and signal dominance to other factions.

Fifthly, in a contentious judicial turn, a decision was made to close activist and thinker Lokman Slim’s assassination file – a move invoking questions about its legal and political ramifications and timing. This sends a pointed message to the regime, prime minister-designate, political forces, and Lebanese citizens that Hezbollah still exerts a hold over the judiciary and that the impunity policy remains untouched, allowing perpetrators to steer decisions and rulings that bury truth and justice.

While extending a hand is constructive, yielding to the terms of subjugation is an entirely different story. For such an initiative to be genuinely effective, it requires a receiving hand, not one that aims to twist and overpower it. 

In this landscape, Lebanese citizens await the promises of the inauguration speech to materialize into concrete actions and the formation of a government reflecting their aspirations, rather than one acquiescing to the opposition’s dictates, particularly concerning the Finance Ministry and the monopolization of Shiite representation.

Marwan El Amine

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

Recognising the failure of Hamas to bring any significant benefits to the Palestinian people by initiating the war on Israel on October 7, 2023, Arab writers explore alternate modalities and question Hamas’s future role as a viable and responsible governing body for Palestinians.
The views expressed in these articles are those of the writers and not of Lay of the Land which assumes no responsibility for the content.
David E. Kaplan
Editor of Lay of the Land

(Article translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

BEHIND HAMAS’S CLAIMS OF VICTORY
“True victors liberate, reclaim refugees, and win battles, not lose them”
By Aws Abo Ata

Al-Arab, London, January 31

In the second round of prisoner exchanges between Israel and Hamas, Hamas orchestrated a media spectacle to project the notion that it remains undefeated following the recent conflict. For much of the world’s populace, particularly the Arab community, displaying dignity, pride, courage, and resilience in the face of profound pain and loss is crucial. 

However, this media display, insinuating that Hamas retains its strength and popularity by showcasing its mechanisms, its distributed members, and the congregation of supporters in the aftermath of the Israeli operations in Gaza, muddies the waters of progress.

With Hamas positioned prominently in governance, the process of reconstruction is hindered or potentially stalled, providing a rationale that aligns with the Israeli Right’s narrative, sustaining conflict, and deterring investors from considering involvement in rebuilding efforts.

Militarily, Mousa Abu Marzook, a leading Hamas figure, remarked candidly in an Al-Arabiya interview that “what transpired was not a war between two parties and two military forces, but rather an extermination campaign.” This raises an enduring question: how can one claim victory amidst annihilation? The scope of the devastation is national, not confined to villages like Deir Yassin, Kafr Qasim, or Tantura, where the number of fatalities was in the dozens, not the tens of thousands as witnessed in Gaza. Did past massacres result in victory? Consider that.

Meanwhile, criticisms persist against Palestinian leadership concerning the Oslo Accords. Yet, the Gaza agreement is even less substantive than Oslo, which encompassed the full homeland, liberating significant prisoners and lands, enabling the return of over half a million refugees, all accomplished without bloodshed. True victors liberate, reclaim refugees, and win battles, not lose them, as exemplified by the subsequent reoccupation of Gaza despite its complete liberation.

Furthermore, political analysts highlight clauses in the Gaza agreement facilitating the departure of 1,500 wounded individuals with families, implying the withdrawal of Qassam militants from Gaza. 

Hamas inherently understands that its governance in Gaza is untenable and lacking international support, evidenced by the Rafah crossing’s management, free of Hamas control, compounded by humanitarian fallout from the Oct. 7 conflict and geopolitical tensions resulting from US President Donald Trump’s proposals to relocate Gazans to Egypt and Jordan – a stance met with staunch Egyptian-Jordanian rejection, straining relations with the US.

The Arab region is unwilling to sustain Hamas’s rule in Gaza due to ramifications on both Palestine and its neighbors’ regional security.

Hamas’s claimed victory extends beyond rhetoric, seeking to fortify itself and evade future national accountability for crises it has precipitated for its people and allies, such as with Qatar, which visibly distanced itself, as shown in the Qatari prime minister and foreign minister’s statements during a Paris interview with Israeli media.

Similarly, Syria, recently recovering from turmoil, has not engaged with Hamas representatives; the Syrian administration insists Palestinian relations be conducted through their embassy in Damascus, excluding faction representatives like Hamas.

Meanwhile, Iran, an ally, is preoccupied with internal losses, focused on instigating unrest in Syria while safeguarding its regime and nuclear ambitions amidst a historic period of instability.

Hamas, with limited allied nations and militias for support, faces vulnerability without them, contrasting [with] the Palestine Liberation Organization, which boasts legitimacy from extensive global diplomatic networks, independent of any singular axis or ideology. Unlike Hamas, the PLO’s credibility endures despite geopolitical shifts, illustrated by the endurance of its representation following the Soviet Union’s collapse and Saddam Hussein’s downfall – highlighting a profound paradox.

– Aws Abo Ata

IS THERE ANOTHER WAY WITH ISRAEL?
By Hazem Saghieh

Asharq Al-Awsat, London, January 29

One might argue that one of the unforeseen benefits of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation was that it threw into question the notion of relying solely on force to resolve the conflict. Neither the numerous wars nor the various forms of resistance have effectively achieved their goals. It is now more crucial than ever to voice certain truths, even if they may seem harsh, accusatory, or unsettling to those accustomed to familiar narratives and sentiments.

The immense Palestinian suffering must not continue unchecked, nor should the hardships of the Lebanese and other populations be burdened by the exploitation of their cause. The situation under Trump’s leadership has only worsened, increasing the likelihood of disasters, displacement, and even acts of genocide.

We must acknowledge that bridging the gaps that disadvantage us – Israel’s international relationships with influential world powers, its technical advancements, nuclear capabilities, and its political and social structure, which can navigate internal contradictions even amidst war – will be impossible, both in the near and distant future. Furthermore, our societies have no desire for conflicts whose primary function has diverged from serving Palestinian interests.

Take Syria, for example, a nation once championing warfare and rhetorical grandstanding, now distancing itself as both people and government from such ideologies. This is not to suggest that Israel poses no problem – certainly not. But it does imply the need for alternative strategies to address the issue that do not resort to violence or endanger peace.

History offers insights into major conflicts, providing potential pathways to exit the war mindset and perhaps even influence Israel toward moderation, rekindling the diminished moderate forces weakened by the pervasive culture of violence and militarization. This approach could reinvigorate the possibility of a two-state solution, a prospect that once rallied over two-thirds of Israeli society during the Oslo Accords.

France and Germany’s historical trajectory offers a pertinent illustration. They faced each other in wars, including the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 – where Germany’s victory led to the humiliation of France and the inception of German unity – and during World War I, which saw Germany’s defeat and the articulation of the Versailles Treaty’s severe terms, cited as a factor in the rise of Nazism. 

Yet, after World War II, despite the shame of occupation, France and Europe, under leaders like François Mitterrand, embraced German unification within a European framework, laying the foundations for the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro.

Similarly, the chronicles of conflict between Japan and Korea, with the former’s occupation of the latter from 1910 to 1945, saw unimaginable atrocities. Despite longstanding grievances, it took only 20 years post-occupation for relations to normalize, although challenges remain, particularly over reparations. Nevertheless, trade and partnerships in the economic, military, and security sectors endure.

The Anglo-Irish discord, dating back to the mid-17th century with Cromwell’s Protestant conquest and subsequent settlements, eventually transitioned from a violent independence war (1919–1921) to the 1998 Northern Ireland settlement that balanced power to appease both Catholics and Protestants, maintaining their respective affiliations.

India’s partition from Pakistan in 1947 led to catastrophic civil strife, displacing millions and claiming countless lives. The subsequent Indo-Pakistani wars highlight ongoing disputes, most prominently over Kashmir. Yet, diplomatic dialogues and trade interactions persist, emphasizing attempts at conciliation.

The Arab-Israeli conflicts are neither unique nor the most egregious examples of war. Perhaps the solution lies in emulating European strategies akin to Mitterrand’s vision, where the European Union served to contain and mitigate perceived threats from future German aggression.

– Hazem Saghieh

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

Lay of the Land Editor:
Exasperated with the devastation and suffering of regional wars, Arab writers below from Saudi Arabia, UAE and Lebanon, expose the late Hezbollah leader’s failings, acknowledge weakness in regional Arab political leadership and suggest with respect to Lebanon, to exploit “weakness as strength” and push for “greater secularism”.

(*Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

WHAT WILL BECOME OF HEZBOLLAH?

By Rami Al-Khalifa Al-Ali

Okaz, Saudi Arabia, October 3

Israel has finally succeeded in targeting the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, after 18 years in hiding. This marks a significant blow to Hezbollah and its Iranian allies. 

The sequence of setbacks inflicted on the militia began with the hacking of their communications network, followed by the assassination of over 500 field commanders in the south over the past year. The campaign culminated in the elimination of second-tier leaders and, ultimately, Nasrallah himself. 

For many, Hezbollah’s influence had already waned following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Despite this, the party insisted on retaining its arms, thus emerging as the sole armed political entity within Lebanon. This led Hezbollah to impose its will on its Lebanese counterparts, crossing a critical line in 2008 when it turned its weapons inward and occupied Beirut. At that moment, Nasrallah’s credibility diminished, both morally and popularly. His once-revered stature further eroded as Hezbollah became the vanguard in Iran’s regional conflicts. 

Nasrallah’s decision to embroil Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis, despite the Lebanese government’s policy of neutrality, underscored his ascendancy over both government and state institutions. His sectarian belligerence in Syria – marked by attacks on civilians – dealt another blow to his reputation. Moreover, Nasrallah’s endorsement of hostilities against Saudi Arabia and support for the Houthi movement in Yemen drew widespread condemnation. 

During the recent conflict, Nasrallah’s unwavering allegiance to Iran’s agenda overshadowed any efforts to uphold Lebanon’s stability or genuinely aid the Palestinian plight in Gaza. 

Now, Nasrallah has departed, leaving Lebanon teetering on the edge. Hezbollah in disarray, and his legacy is marred among much of the Arab populace, tainted by violence and division. When Nasrallah aligned Hezbollah with Iran’s regional ambitions, the organization transformed from a cohesive ideological entity with clear objectives into mercenaries fulfilling foreign agendas. This change necessitated increasing recruitment and liaison with foreign intelligence services, eventually exposing Hezbollah’s vulnerabilities to Israel. 

As highlighted in an investigative report by the Financial Times, Mossad’s penetration of Hezbollah’s ranks signaled an unprecedented moment of internal collapse reaching up to the group’s leadership, while Iranian overseers appeared indifferent. 

For those poised to succeed Nasrallah, there is a glimmer of hope. A reevaluation of Hezbollah’s role within Lebanon is imperative. The goal should be to evolve into a national entity invested in nation-building rather than acting as a pawn in foreign conflicts, thus avoiding a fate where they are discarded after serving their purpose or becoming a liability.

– Rami Al-Khalifa Al-Ali

WAR ON HUMANITY AND CIVILIZATION

By Radwan al-Sayed

Al-Ittihad, UAE, October 19

War is erupting across various regions, casting people into a spectrum of despair, leaving them in states of submission and hopelessness. This turmoil is tragically evident in places like Gaza and Lebanon, where combatants are heedless to the calls for peace, allowing the horrors of war to devastate the core of humanity and civilization.

In a recent summit, Gulf countries engaged with European Union counterparts, emphasizing the importance of cooperation and peace, and advocating for international resolutions. They recognize that it’s in everyone’s best interest to avoid shedding blood or falling prey to destructive whims.

The Gulf nations, having already extended significant humanitarian aid to Gaza, are now also mobilizing support for Lebanon, urging an end to the bombings and calling for the preservation of life and stability.

The future remains uncertain for those engulfed in the Gaza conflict. For the displaced inhabitants of Gaza, who have endured multiple upheavals, concerns over victory, the problems experienced elsewhere in our beleaguered region are now secondary.

In Lebanon, however, the solution is apparent: adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, elect a new president, and ensure peace by deploying a robust army alongside international forces at the southern border.

Thus, two divergent paths emerge: one of peace and resolution, championed by Arabs since the 2002 Arab League summit in Beirut; and the other of obstruction and delay, which benefits no one, yet is often pursued by warring factions at the expense of humanity and progress.

For both Gaza and Lebanon, survival and the prospect of a free and dignified existence hinge on embracing peace, maintaining the essence of humanity, and cultivating a future filled with dreams and hopes for children and their families.

This marks the fourth or fifth conflict in Gaza since 2007, each commencing with rocket fire and concluding in devastation and extensive loss of life. The latest war has displaced more than two million people on multiple occasions, while the ongoing sixth or seventh war has resulted in thousands of fatalities and 1.2 million displaced persons. The Lebanese people declare their inability to endure further hardship, with many seeking asylum in Syria.

Global attention is focused on the plight in Gaza and Lebanon, yet the catastrophe in Syria – where half a million have perished and millions more have been displaced internally and into neighboring countries – cannot be overlooked. Syrians are now hosting displaced Lebanese, straining a country already fraught with its challenges and besieged by a bleak future.

Since the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, conflicts have persistently plagued Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Now, fresh and lingering calamities in Gaza and Palestine add to this troubled narrative.

Each faction threatens to usher in a “new Middle East.” What is new about a region stripped of peace and life’s basic necessities? The elderly, reminiscing about happier times, recall the region’s old name: the Fertile Crescent, where the olive tree once stood as a symbol of abundance and tranquility. Alas, this year, Palestine and southern Lebanon have lost their olive harvest, prompting concerns about what remains in northern Lebanon, now crowded with waves of displaced individuals fleeing from the southern Bekaa and suburbs. Yesterday, the city of Nabatiya witnessed devastation unprecedented in its history. What fate awaits Nabatiya, Baalbek, and the many historic and cultural landscapes?

The absence of Arab leadership has been felt in a region where Americans and Iranians wield influence, allowing wars to dominate. It is imperative that Arabs reclaim their presence on the global stage now more than ever before.  

– Radwan al-Sayed

WILL LEBANON DEFEAT ISRAEL? YES – THIS IS HOW

By Raouf Kob

Al-Nahar, Lebanon, October 18

These words were originally meant for introspection, a personal reflection that I now address to the public, hoping they resonate with readers. They are directed at supporters of the group known as the Axis of Resistance, as well as those who stand apart from it. I write from the perspective of a concerned Lebanese citizen who yearns, like all Lebanese do, for a nation that is free, sovereign, and independent. A country shielded from any foreign power attempting to manipulate its security and destiny, be it Israel or any other nation. 

Previously, I’ve penned three letters to late Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, published in this very newspaper. In the third, I pledged it would be my last. These letters served as an appeal, urging Hezbollah to advocate for a secular state in Lebanon. They were not insults, criticisms, or reproaches, unlike the discourse from the party’s usual adversaries. 

I confess openly that I’ve never aligned with Hezbollah’s ideology, nor with the ideology of any Lebanese party or political movement. This is largely because all Lebanese parties are inherently sectarian. Their supporters hail from similar socioeconomic strata, and I’ve never belonged to any religious or political faction. I believe Lebanon’s core suffering stems from this fragmentation among its citizens, a division that estranges them from genuine patriotism and prompts mutual accusations of treason and collusion with outsiders.

I am not naive enough to claim that those aligned with Hezbollah betray Lebanon. They are committed to defending their land and its dignity. However, as a Lebanese expatriate, it anguishes me to hear accusations against those outside the Hezbollah camp of cultural and political betrayal. Such behavior is an affront beyond justice; all Lebanese passionately love their country. Just as every sheik has his own methodology, as the Azharites would say, each Lebanese finds unique ways to express love and loyalty to the nation, even taking up arms when necessary. Religious fanaticism sows division, yet some Lebanese do not support Hezbollah in the current southern conflict. These individuals are not traitors, mercenaries, or agents; they are patriots following their own compass, standing against Israel and Zionism as fervently as Hezbollah. 

I recognize the numerous motives for opposing Hezbollah, often rooted in religious inclinations in our multifaceted sectarian society. These inclinations are not novel; they are deeply ingrained in our history and culture and were prevalent before colonial forces invaded. Nevertheless, Lebanon can neutralize Israel without resorting to bullets, and I earnestly implore Hezbollah’s supporters to hear me out with patience. 

During the last century, a notable Lebanese politician, Pierre Gumayel, made the insightful observation that Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness. Though not a scholar or ideologist, Gemayel’s statement resonates as a guiding principle. Lebanon’s paradoxical strength and resilience emerge from its perceived fragility. Some might mockingly equate this to Hezbollah’s claim that Israel is weaker than a spider’s web. I argue instead through analogy: when two men brawl on the street, bystanders remain indifferent; however, when a grown man assaults a child, all witnesses stand with the child, ensuring the attacker faces justice. 

Politically speaking, consider if a powerful nation like France decided to invade a small European duchy like Luxembourg. While possible, such an action would be universally condemned, uniting France’s citizens against their government. Luxembourg’s strength stems not just from its petite size but from its peaceful, advanced governance that mirrors the systems of other developed democracies.

This suggests Lebanon should carry arms only to hold an aggressor temporarily at bay until international support arrives. Ultimately, its true strength lies in its “weakness” and its peaceful, advanced reputation. 

Reflecting on whether Israel would have dared to attack a Lebanon that modeled its political system after Luxembourg, Finland, or Norway is telling. Lebanon’s issues stem from a corrupt system built on deceit, exploitation, and religious manipulation. It tragically lays itself bare for exploitation, inviting disaster without concern from the global community.

Historical examples reinforce this: the 1967 Six Day War left a neutral Lebanon untouched due to its armistice with Israel, a peace that endured until the 1969 Cairo Agreement tragically embroiled Lebanon in proxy wars. Consider the “weak” children of the West Bank during the 1980s intifada, how global empathy stood with them, igniting solidarity movements worldwide. This uprising only waned when leaders like Yasser Arafat appropriated and monopolized it, exacerbating the tragedies that befell Lebanon, Palestine, and its people. 

In my previous correspondences to Nasrallah, I advocated for a secular civil system as Lebanon’s salvation – a system fostering unity, aligned with divine laws, protecting Lebanon from the manipulation of opportunistic figures, elevating its global standing, and earning respect. Lebanon will reclaim its dignity and rights only when self-respect prevails. Through reason over instinct and intolerance, a peaceful Lebanon can oppose aggressors like Israel by unveiling their true nature, supporting Palestine, and aligning with Arab causes not through force, but with truth, reason, and steadfast resolve. 

In Kalila wa-Dimna, the famous collection of fables translated by Ibn al-Muqaffa, the author observed that a strong wind may uproot the solid tree but not the resilient grass. Imam Ali emphasized the importance of self-awareness, and Socrates charged us to “know thyself.” Their wisdom reminds us that Lebanon must find strength within its vulnerabilities to emerge as a sovereign, impregnable state immune to external threats. Such understanding is crucial for Lebanon’s resurgence and prosperity, ensuring it stands poised against the turmoil of the outside world.

– Raouf Kob

While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves.  LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).