THE ARAB VOICE – APRIL 2025

Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media

What has significantly changed following Israel’s defensive response to Hezbollah’s missile war on Israel following Hamas’ October 7 massacre is that the now weakened Shia Islamist political party and paramilitary group is increasingly losing Arab media support and is now being perceived as more of a liability than an asset to the best interests of Lebanon.

See recent articles (below) in the Arab media addressing this issue below.

David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land

(*Articles below translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)

(1)

THE HEZBOLLAH PARADOX

History does not move in reverse – especially not in war
By Jean Feghali 

Nidaa Al Watan, Lebanon, March 21

Hezbollah’s actions and rhetoric have become increasingly contradictory, particularly in the aftermath of its defeat by Israel. On one hand, it seeks to assert itself as the ultimate authority, acting as both the state and the dominant power, yet on the other, it scrambles for protection under the very state it undermines – having lost the political and strategic umbrellas it once relied on from its leadership structure to the Assad regime.

This contradiction is evident in its stance toward the Lebanese Army. It calls for the army’s presence in the town of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, yet the moment the army arrives, Hezbollah unleashes its loyalists to hurl insults, level accusations, and brand army officers and soldiers as “agents” and “Zionists”.

What exactly does Hezbollah want? In practical terms, it wants to revert to the status quo before October 8, 2023, when it launched its operation against Israel. But history does not move in reverse – especially not in war. The reality on the ground has changed entirely.

Hezbollah has suffered devastating losses, including two of its top leaders, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, along with over 30 of its highest-ranking field commanders and more than 120 mid-level field officers. Hundreds of others have been rendered unfit for service, and it has lost much of its military infrastructure south of the Litani River, including key tunnel networks and ammunition depots.

Externally, the situation is just as dire. Hezbollah has lost what was once its greatest strategic asset: the Syrian lever. With the fall of the Assad regime, it no longer enjoys the logistical and territorial depth that allowed it to operate with impunity. Forced to retreat into Lebanon’s borders, it has attempted to revive its long-standing mantra of “the people, the army, and the resistance.”

But this is where the contradiction deepens: How can it cling to this formula while simultaneously discrediting one of its supposed pillars – the Lebanese Army? The party’s own loyalists have accused the army’s officers and soldiers of treason, labeling them “Zionist agents,” effectively dismantling the very equation Hezbollah seeks to uphold. What remains is an absurd inversion: “the people, the Zionists, and the resistance.”

Hezbollah is now ensnared in its own rhetoric – demanding the army’s protection while actively eroding its legitimacy. Simply repeating the claim of “embracing the army” is no longer enough. If Hezbollah truly seeks legitimacy, it must do more than just pay lip service to the idea of national unity; it must accept the reality that the Lebanese Army alone has the rightful monopoly on weapons.

Until Hezbollah reaches this level of acknowledgment, the rhetoric of its officials – including the latest remarks by MP Hussein Hajj Hassan – is nothing more than a smokescreen, an attempt to obscure the fundamental contradiction of a movement that, on one hand, demands the army’s support, while on the other, denounces it as a traitor.

The real test for Hezbollah is whether it can confront this paradox – or whether it will continue to evade the inevitable reckoning with Lebanon’s sovereignty.

-Jean Feghali 

(2)

HEZBOLLAH SEVERS OUTSTRECHED HAND

Rather than reflecting on its ruinous past, Hezbollah choses delusion brandishing threats to manipulate public fear.
By Assaad Bechara

Nidaz Al Watan, Lebanon, April 17

An extended hand is met with severance – this is Hezbollah’s enduring equation, a principle it has embedded into its conduct for decades.

Dialog, in Hezbollah’s view, is never a pathway to mutual understanding but a tactical maneuver. Partnership is not a framework for cooperation but a platform for domination. 

In Hezbollah’s lexicon, any initiative toward reconciliation is rebranded as a conspiracy that must be crushed – either through force or political subversion.

In 2006, national dialogue among political factions was swiftly followed by catastrophe, as Hezbollah unilaterally abducted Israeli soldiers, dragging the country into a devastating war that destroyed infrastructure and spilled innocent blood, bypassing all legitimate state authority.

When Hezbollah joined the government and refused to honor its agreements, the May 7 clashes of Beirut and Mount Lebanon erupted – a violent episode burned into national memory. The Baabda Declaration, forged at president Michel Suleiman’s dialogue table, was barely dry before Hezbollah disavowed it, treating it as though it had never existed.

Today, President Joseph Aoun extends his hand under enormous strain, facing both international and domestic pressure to confront the illegal presence of arms in Lebanon. 

His goal is to safeguard Lebanon’s military institution and uphold civil peace. Hezbollah’s response: not political dissent or legal argument, but overt threats to sever his hand – a discourse alien to democratic societies, steeped instead in fascist overtones that ignore the nation’s painful history.

Rather than reflect on its ruinous past, Hezbollah chooses escapism, brandishing the threat of chaos to manipulate public fear, whipping its supporters into frenzies of rhetoric and deflection. Meanwhile, Israel continues to escalate its warnings, emboldened by shifting power dynamics that expose Hezbollah’s so-called deterrence as a crumbling myth.

On the domestic front, Hezbollah no longer hides that its weapons are not Lebanon’s shield, but a lever for foreign agendas and a tool for internal coercion. 

It is a party that does not seek common ground because it is nourished by discord and ruin. 

In Hezbollah’s worldview, anyone who dares to build a state is not a partner but a traitor – someone whose outstretched hand deserves to be cut off. Unless the Lebanese people rise to reject this doctrine of sabotage and repression, the state will remain shackled, and the metaphor of severed hands will remain a grim rule imposed on any effort at national rescue.

– Assaad Bechara

(3)

INTERGRATING HEZBOLLAH INTO LEBANESE ARMY?

How can Hezbollah fighters be transformed from ideological foot soldiers of the mullahs into disciplined military personnel who accept orders only from the Lebanese chain of command?
By Riad Kahwaji

An-Nahar, Lebanon, April 18

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun recently announced his intention to lead a direct dialogue with Hezbollah’s leadership regarding the transfer of its weapons to legitimate state authorities. He also expressed support for the integration of Hezbollah members into the national military establishment – not as an autonomous resistance force akin to the Popular Mobilization Forces, but as part of the state’s official defense apparatus. This initiative is a key component of President Aoun’s broader efforts to resolve the ongoing dilemma of Hezbollah’s weapons, which continues to obstruct reconstruction efforts and delay the flow of international aid.

Reports suggest that the Lebanese army has already quietly begun collecting weapons from certain Hezbollah sites, out of the public eye in order to avoid political embarrassment. However, the issue of integrating Hezbollah members into the armed forces poses a significant and complex challenge, both domestically and internationally – one that may not have been fully anticipated by the president’s advisory team and must be urgently addressed.

The Lebanese army has a relatively successful track record in absorbing former militia members following the civil war and the implementation of the Taif Agreement in the early 1990s. 

At that time, Hezbollah’s weapons were exempted due to regional arrangements brokered by the late Syrian president Hafez Assad, under the justification that they were necessary for resisting the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon.

The militias that were integrated into the army at the time were secular in nature, with nationalist leanings on both the Right and Left. Their fighters underwent training focused on discipline, adherence to military hierarchy, and alignment with the Lebanese army’s doctrine. 

Hezbollah, however, is fundamentally different. It is an ideological party rooted in armed Shi’ite political Islam, established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) as part of a broader regional project that has extended far beyond Lebanon’s borders over the past four decades.

Many of Hezbollah’s youth have been raised from childhood in party-run institutions, indoctrinated with loyalty to the supreme leader of Iran. These cadres have played a key role in militarizing Shi’ite movements across the Arab world, particularly since 2004.

The use of religious doctrine to justify violence within Shi’ite political Islam is not fundamentally different from its Sunni counterpart. Both rely on religious rulings and fatwas issued by clerical authorities deemed legitimate by their respective movements. 

In Sunni jihadist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS, fighters pledge allegiance to an emir or religious figure who sanctions acts of violence, including suicide bombings, promising divine reward. 

Hezbollah’s system is more structured but mirrors the same ideological framework. What are locally known as “religious mandates” are issued to fighters, defining their mission and assuring martyrdom status in the event of death.

Hezbollah’s leaders have openly acknowledged their allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader and their organic ties to the IRGC. Militant political Islam – whether Sunni or Shi’ite – rejects national borders in favor of transnational religious unity, with ultimate objectives such as reestablishing the caliphate or expanding the Islamic nation according to each sect’s interpretation.

Globally, there is no precedent for rehabilitating and integrating members of armed ideological Islamist groups into a national army, particularly in a country like Lebanon, which has endured decades of sectarian strife. 

Has the Lebanese army command developed a concrete plan for such integration? 

How can young Hezbollah members be transformed from ideological foot soldiers of the mullahs into disciplined military personnel who accept orders only from the Lebanese chain of command, without deference to external religious authorities? 

Will Lebanese Shi’ite clerics be recruited to support this transformation?

Since 2001, as part of the global war on terror and the emergence of al-Qaida and later ISIS, Western and Arab states have focused on confronting armed Sunni political Islam. The Lebanese army has engaged in multiple confrontations with Sunni militant groups in Tripoli, Sidon, and the outskirts of Arsal. 

These groups were defeated, many of their members imprisoned, and Lebanon’s security services continue to monitor and detain suspects affiliated with them – hundreds remain incarcerated without trial. 

How, then, can Sunni political Islamists in Lebanon justify the inclusion of Hezbollah members in the same army that has persecuted them for decades? This question is particularly sensitive in Lebanon’s sectarian political system and must not be overlooked.

Furthermore, the new Syrian regime and its military forces are themselves born of Sunni political Islam, raising the potential for future complications if Hezbollah fighters are absorbed into the Lebanese army. 

Most Arab countries – and especially the Gulf states – have rejected both Sunni and Shi’ite manifestations of armed political Islam. 

Even Western powers that once cooperated with Shi’ite militias now classify many of them, including Hezbollah, as terrorist organizations and are actively working to dismantle their influence as part of broader efforts to contain Iran’s regional reach. Therefore, despite the good intentions and theoretical appeal of integrating Hezbollah’s armed wing into the Lebanese military, the initiative carries significant risks and red flags that must be taken seriously to prevent future instability.

 – Riad Kahwaji

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