In line with the company the ANC keeps, Pretoria reached its political verdict first – the legal campaign followed.
By Shaun Schutte
Recently, I penned a piece on what lay beneath Gaza examining the military world Hamas constructed underneath its own civilian population. After all, the tunnels, hostages and submerged battlefield cannot be removed from any honest examination of what happened above them.
On 25 August 2026, South Africa submitted another “substantial dossier” to the International Court of Justice, alleging that Israel had failed to comply with the Court’s provisional measures. DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation) announced it publicly on 28 August, but the dossier itself has not been released.
South Africans are therefore expected to accept the government’s description without being allowed to examine the evidence, test its conclusions or establish whether it properly accounts for Hamas’s fighters, hostages and underground military infrastructure.
That took me back to the beginning—not the beginning of Israel’s military response, but the beginning of Pretoria’s political campaign.
The timeline is uncomfortable, but it is documented.
THE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED LONG BEFORE 7 OCTOBER
The ANC’s relationship with Hamas did not begin when civilians started dying in Gaza. In 2015, the ANC formalised party-to-party relations with Hamas during a visit led by
Hamas political leader Khaled Mashal. In December 2018, the ANC Parliamentary Caucus signed a further memorandum with Hamas’s Change and Reform Bloc.

That agreement was not limited to ceremonial solidarity with the Palestinian people. It committed the parties to cooperation on matters of “common interest”, including international pressure against Israel, support for the BDS campaign and using Parliament’s oversight powers to implement the ANC’s decision to downgrade diplomatic relations with Israel.
Pretoria therefore did not suddenly encounter Hamas while responding to a humanitarian crisis in 2023. The governing party already had a formal political relationship with the organisation and had committed itself to coordinated pressure against the Israeli state.
TEN DAYS AFTER THE MASSACRE
On 7 October 2023, Hamas crossed into Israel, killed approximately 1,200 people and seized about 250 hostages before retreating into Gaza.
Ten days later, South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Naledi Pandor spoke directly with Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh.
DIRCO said Haniyeh requested the call and that humanitarian assistance was discussed, but the documented fact remains that South Africa’s foreign minister was communicating with the leader of Iranian-backed Hamas only days after the massacre.

Five days later, on 22 October, Pandor travelled to Tehran. She met Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi, delivered a message from Cyril Ramaphosa and held discussions with Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian.
Then, on 27 October, the United States Treasury sanctioned Khaled Qaddoumi. Treasury identified him as a longstanding Hamas member living in Tehran, Hamas’s representative in Iran and the liaison responsible for maintaining relations between Hamas and the Iranian government.
By early December, Qaddoumi was in Johannesburg alongside other senior Hamas figures attending the Fifth Global Convention of Solidarity with Palestine.
This was not merely another Palestinian delegate arriving to discuss civilian suffering. It was the man formally identified as the connection between Hamas and Tehran, appearing in South Africa weeks after Pandor had spoken to Haniyeh and met the Iranian leadership.
Hamas, Tehran and Pretoria were not strangers discovering one another during a crisis. The relationships were already in place.

THE VERDICT CAME BEFORE THE CASE
By 6 November 2023, the South African government was already publicly referring to Israel’s conduct as genocide.
No case had been filed. Israel had not presented its defense, no ICJ judge had examined South Africa’s evidence, and much of the military infrastructure Hamas built beneath Gaza had not yet been exposed.
Pretoria reached its political verdict first. The legal campaign followed.

Senior Hamas representatives arrived in Johannesburg during the first week of December. On 29 December, South Africa instituted its genocide case against Israel at the ICJ, and Iran immediately recognised the strategic value of what Pretoria had done. Tehran gave the case its full support and publicly praised South Africa’s action as courageous and honourable.
None of this proves that Iran wrote South Africa’s application or instructed Ramaphosa to file it. It does, however, destroy the carefully maintained impression that Pretoria approached this war as a politically detached guardian of international law.
While Iran finances, arms and trains Hamas, the ANC had already formalised relations with Hamas, committed itself to political pressure against Israel and maintained diplomatic
relations with Tehran.
After 7 October, Pandor spoke to Haniyeh, carried Ramaphosa’s message to Iran and met its leadership. Weeks later, Hamas’s own liaison with Tehran appeared in Johannesburg before South Africa approached the ICJ.
No verified evidence establishes that Iran purchased South Africa’s foreign policy.
The documented relationship shows that it did not need to.
The ANC had already aligned itself with Hamas, committed itself to political pressure against Israel and maintained direct contact with Tehran. By the time Pretoria approached
the ICJ, the direction of travel had been decided years earlier.
THE ALIGNMENT DID NOT END AT THE HAGUE
South Africa has condemned the killing of Israeli civilians on 7 October, and that fact must be acknowledged. However, as Pretoria’s international campaign intensified, the massacre, the hostages and Hamas’s continuing military presence were progressively pushed into the background.
The government repeatedly presented Israel’s conduct as genocide before the ICJ made any such finding. At the same time, South Africa maintained its relationship with Iran, condemned Israeli attacks on Iranian targets and rejected international pressure to distance itself from Tehran.
In March 2026, DIRCO director-general Zane Dangor rejected American pressure to cut ties with Iran. During the same diplomatic confrontation, Pretoria rejected demands that it abandon the genocide case against Israel.

These positions do not exist in separate political worlds. Iran considers Israel an enemy and benefits directly when Israel is prosecuted internationally for genocide. South Africa has supplied that international platform.
THE MONEY REMAINS UNPROVEN
There have been allegations that Iran or Qatar financed the ANC or assisted with the ICJ case. Those suspicions intensified after the financially distressed ANC announced on 22 December 2023 that it had settled its long-running dispute with Ezulweni Investments, only seven days before South Africa approached the Court.
The timing raised legitimate questions, particularly because the settlement was not transparent. However, no verified evidence establishes that Iran or Qatar paid the ANC, funded the case or purchased South Africa’s foreign policy.
I will not convert suspicion into fact merely because it fits the chronology.
The financial allegation remains unproved. The formal relationship with Hamas, the contact with Haniyeh, the visit to Tehran, Qaddoumi’s appearance in Johannesburg and Iran’s support for the ICJ campaign are documented.
That evidence is enough to expose the political alignment behind Pretoria’s supposedly neutral legal crusade.
THE DOSSIER CARRIES SOUTH AFRICA’S NAME
Israel remains subject to international law, and credible allegations concerning particular attacks or military decisions must be investigated. What cannot be accepted is Pretoria presenting genocidal intention as established fact when the ICJ has made no such finding and South Africa’s newest dossier remains hidden from public examination.
The narrative advanced by Pretoria is remarkably convenient for Iran and Hamas. Push 7 October into the background, reduce the hostages to a footnote, remove Hamas from beneath Gaza, deny Israel the practical ability to destroy the military threat and then prosecute the destruction remaining above ground as genocide.
That is not a politically neutral account of the war. It is the strategic outcome Iran requires from a friendly government with access to the world’s highest court.
The dossier may carry South Africa’s name, but the political alignment behind it was established years before the first document reached The Hague.
Hamas built the battlefield beneath Gaza.
The ANC built the relationship that carried its narrative into the ICJ.
NOT IN THE NAME OF EVERY SOUTH AFRICAN
The ANC government has used South Africa’s name, institutions and international standing to carry this case into the ICJ.
It did not file the case in the name of the ANC. It filed it in the name of the Republic of South Africa, creating the impression that Ramaphosa’s political position represents the settled voice of our entire country.
It does not represent mine, and I am not alone.
South Africans were never consulted on whether the ANC’s longstanding relationship with Hamas and alignment with Iran should be converted into our national foreign policy. We were not allowed to examine the evidence, question the political relationships behind it or see the latest dossier submitted in our name.
Ramaphosa may control the executive authority that instituted the case, but he does not own the conscience of every South African citizen. He cannot take the ANC’s political alignment, stamp the name of our country across it and then tell the world that he speaks for all of us. Our name was used.
Our international standing was committed.
Our citizens were never given a voice.
If Pretoria believes its political alignment had no influence on this campaign, then let the Presidency, DIRCO and the ANC place their explanation beneath the documented evidence.
Until then, Ramaphosa must understand one thing clearly:
HE MAY SPEAK FOR THE ANC GOVERNMENT.
HE DOES NOT SPEAK FOR ME.
About the writer:

Shaun Schutte is a South African security professional, independent writer and founder of Black Knight Bodyguards. He served for eight years in the South African Defence Force before spending seventeen years in international close protection and security operations across conflict environments including Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola and Somalia. His writing draws on this operational background to examine asymmetric warfare, terrorism, protective security and the political narratives surrounding modern conflict. He writes from the perspective of a practitioner rather than an academic, combining publicly available evidence with lessons gained through direct experience in unstable and hostile environments.
While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves. LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).


































































