Perspectives and insights from writers in the Arab media
If Israelis are battling to decipher their election results wondering where it will eventually lead, Arab writers in the region are no less curious and concerned. They see the 2026 election not as a purely internal Israeli affair but a strategic junction that could impact upon the Palestinian issue and the broader regional landscape.
Hardly a surprise, much of the Arab discourse reveals ambivalence. While on the one hand, many commentators make no secret of their hope that Israel’s current government will be replaced, on the other hand, these same commentators are skeptical of any meaningful policy change under an alternative Israeli government, particularly on the “issue of Palestine”.
While for Israelis, the distinction between their political camps is immense, for many Arab observers, they see the election less between “right” and “left” and more of “different shades of right.”
Below are two illuminating perspectives that capture the Arab understanding of Israel’s 2026 election and its uncertain aftermath.
David E. Kaplan
Editor Lay of the Land
November 9, 2026
(Articles Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)
ISRAEL AFTER THE ELECTIONS: CONSENSUS OR CONFRONTATION?
By Tarek Fahmy
Al-Ittihad, UAE, October 31
Despite predictions that Israel’s parliamentary elections would produce no fundamentally new political reality and would merely extend the pattern established by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s previous governments, some within Israeli society, particularly former military officers, see a deeper problem. They believe Israeli voters remain heavily influenced by the domestic media and are unable to assess their country’s position within a complicated regional environment where Israel continues to face rejection and hostile developments that undermine its interests.
From this perspective, the electorate has failed to adopt a different approach to the challenges confronting Israel. This requires a serious reassessment, particularly because no incoming government will easily repair the country’s internal divisions. Instead, it will operate through familiar coalition arrangements and complicated political calculations, pursuing compromises designed to satisfy its supporters rather than confronting the larger questions of Israel’s future, its ability to preserve past achievements and the need to rebuild a society facing a profound crisis.
The likely outcome reflects a bleak reality for a society unable to escape the pressure of the right, which will remain the dominant political force, or adequately absorb the changes taking place around it. Much of the electoral speculation centered on the composition of the next government and the emergence of new political figures from the military establishment, often without substantial political or economic experience.
Yet Israel faces a structural crisis requiring more than a reshuffling of personalities. Any governing coalition should formulate new policies rather than perpetuate Netanyahu’s current approach under a different arrangement. The immediate challenge is therefore domestic, particularly amid fears that the religious right will retain its grip on power. Most of the politicians contesting these elections have familiar records and offer little prospect of genuine change.
Israel’s difficulty is not simply forming a government. The possible coalition scenarios were largely anticipated before voting began, reflecting established party structures and the electorate’s response to them. Netanyahu’s departure would not, by itself, solve the problem. Nor would a government headed by former general Gadi Eisenkot necessarily rescue Israel from the profound crisis that has brought it to the edge of the abyss.
President Isaac Herzog has warned about the consequences for Israeli security and even the possibility of civil war, alarming the public and encouraging at least superficial agreement in response. Israel must therefore use the post-election period to restore consensus and build renewed national resilience, regardless of the results or whether the individuals in power change. This requires reorganizing political priorities and reconsidering the policies governing coalition relationships.
Israel’s party history, however, suggests that producing policies acceptable to all forces inside and outside a coalition will be extremely difficult. The country needs genuinely cohesive coalition agreements, rather than repeated warnings that its political factions cannot work together.
Netanyahu has repeatedly called for a national-unity government bringing Israelis together, an idea raised shortly before the elections. Eisenkot, however, declared that he would not enter a coalition with Netanyahu and would pursue a different course. This suggests that meaningful agreement may remain elusive until Israel’s entire party landscape is reorganized, rather than simply determining whether Likud can prevail over emerging rivals. Likud’s accumulated political experience will also influence the calculations of competing parties.
After the elections, Israeli policy toward its regional neighbors is likely to remain shaped by military considerations, including an expansionist strategy and security arrangements imposed in areas Israel regards as strategically sensitive. At the same time, efforts will continue to unite the Israeli public around perceived threats, particularly by reviving the Iranian question and maintaining Hezbollah and the Houthis as adversaries.
Domestically, genuine change is equally unlikely. Israel’s internal crisis will take years to overcome, especially if controversial legislation continues, including measures concerning the ultra-Orthodox community, military obligations, loyalty, and national cohesion. An electorate already confused by competing pressures has had limited opportunities for genuine choice under the influence of the media, powerful institutions, and political forces seeking to preserve the existing order for their own purposes. The election may change the composition of the government, but without a fundamental reconsideration of Israel’s domestic and regional policies, the underlying crisis will remain.
– Tarek Fahmy
ARABS & ISRAEL’S ELECTIONS: A ONE-SIDED LOVE AFFAIR
By Adhwan al-Ahmari
Independent Arabia, UK, October 29
One of the stranger phenomena these days is the eager anticipation with which Arabs are following Israel’s elections. Without exaggeration, interest may be greater than in the American midterm elections. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may win or lose, but that is not the important point. What deserves attention is the enthusiasm among some Arabs for the opposing camp led by Gadi Eisenkot, sometimes even because of his Moroccan Jewish background and the prospect that, if victorious, he would become Israel’s first Sephardi prime minister.
In short, this support is motivated by hostility toward Netanyahu and what some regard as the crimes committed by “Mr. Bibi” against Gaza’s population, alongside the continuing bombardment of Syrian and Lebanese territory.
This is hardly the first time Arabs have supported one Israeli political camp against another or anxiously awaited an Israeli election result. The irony is that many of those following, supporting, or opposing particular candidates refuse to recognize Israel itself.
In 1992, when Arabs hoped for Labor Party leader Yitzhak Rabin to defeat the right-wing prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, their anticipation was justified. Rabin won, subsequently paving the way for the 1993 Oslo Accords and the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel the following year. Even Netanyahu, whose defeat some now eagerly await, previously attracted Arab support against Ehud Olmert after the first Gaza war. That support was not born of affection for Netanyahu but anger over Olmert’s military campaign.
Such rapid political wagers are emotional. The eventual outcome has been the collapse of Israel’s peace camp and an expansion of settlements since 2010 on a scale surpassing what came before.
The reality is that Eisenkot does not differ from Netanyahu in opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state. He is no advocate of peace. During his election campaign, he even sought to outflank Netanyahu by criticizing earlier indications that “Mr. Bibi” might accept Palestinian statehood. The candidate some Arabs hope will win is therefore someone who reproaches Netanyahu for having been open to granting Palestinians rights. This contradicts Eisenkot’s own promises to protect West Bank Palestinians from settler attacks and halt settlement expansion.
Eisenkot is also associated with the “Dahiya doctrine” from the 2006 war against Hezbollah, a military approach that permits overwhelming force against civilian infrastructure in areas associated with the organization.
Anyone reviewing three decades of Israeli elections will find that Arab expectations rarely involve reading between the lines. Instead, one camp is applauded simply to spite another. The only occasion on which Arab observers truly won this electoral lottery may have been Rabin’s victory in 1992.
In Lebanon, a popular saying goes: “If Likud wins, pack your bags and run.” My fear is that an Eisenkot victory could strangle what remains of the Palestinian dream. He may not win, of course, and that currently appears the more likely outcome.
Arab anticipation of Israeli election results, and the hope invested in one candidate over another, amounts to an acknowledgment of Israel’s existence and a belief that a prime minister might eventually pursue reconciliation, grant rights to the land’s original inhabitants, halt settlement construction, and recognize a Palestinian state.
Chinese culture offers a famous story illustrating contradiction, reportedly recorded some 2,000 years ago. A weapons merchant in the ancient state of Chu displayed his wares at a market. Holding up a shield, he declared: “Buy my shield! It is so strong that no spear can penetrate it.” He then raised a spear and announced: “Buy my spear! It is so sharp that it can penetrate any shield.” A wise man approached and asked: “What would happen if we struck your shield with your spear?”
The meaning lies in the wise man’s question.
– Adhwan al-Ahmari
While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves. LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).