While creating a fine photo-op, 21 national flags do not a verdict make.
By Shaun Schutte
On 22 September 2026, the International Court of Justice confirmed that Colombia had withdrawn its intervention from South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. President Abelardo De La Espriella’s government has also restored diplomatic relations with Israel and reversed other decisions taken by the previous administration, while Nicaragua had already withdrawn its separate application to intervene in April 2025.
Colombia’s decision matters because it exposes something the ANC government has been allowed to blur since it filed the case on 29 December 2023. Pretoria repeatedly creates the impression that every country appearing in the proceedings has joined South Africa, supports its accusation and accepts that Israel committed genocide.
That is not what the court record shows.
South Africa is the applicant making the accusation. Israel is the respondent denying it. The other countries are interveners, and intervention does not automatically mean joining South Africa’s side or accepting that its allegation has been proven.
Under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute, any state party to the Genocide Convention may intervene when the interpretation of that Convention is in dispute. A country may explain how it believes genocide, genocidal intent and the duties of states should be interpreted without presenting new factual evidence, endorsing South Africa’s allegations or declaring Israel guilty.
Palestine and Belize also invoked Article 62, claiming a specific legal interest that may be affected by the eventual judgment. That gives them a different basis for requesting participation, but it still does not transform every government appearing in the courtroom into an independent witness for Pretoria.
THE COURTROOM ANALOGY
Imagine a prosecutor bringing twenty-one people into a courtroom and then walking outside to tell the public that all twenty-one are witnesses supporting the prosecution.
When their statements are examined, the picture changes. Some openly support the accusation. Others are merely explaining how they believe the law should be interpreted. One specifically avoids deciding the disputed facts, while four warn that the prosecution may be attempting to lower the standard required to prove the crime.
The prosecutor nevertheless points towards everyone inside the courtroom and presents them as one united group standing behind the accusation.
That is the impression Pretoria has created, and it is misleading.
THE COUNTRIES LEANING TOWARDS PRETORIA
Libya intervened on 10 May 2024 and left very little room for doubt about its position. It alleges that Israel’s acts and omissions are genocidal and were committed with the required specific intention to destroy Palestinians in Gaza as part of the broader Palestinian national, racial and ethnic group.
Libya is not simply discussing the meaning of the Convention. It has aligned itself directly with South Africa’s accusation.
Mexico followed on 24 May 2024, concentrating on the obstruction of humanitarian assistance, destruction of civilian and cultural infrastructure and the cumulative consequences of Israel’s military campaign.
Its submission advances a broader method of inferring genocidal intent and materially assists Pretoria, but it does not provide an independent judicial finding that Israel entered Gaza intending to destroy the Palestinian people.
Palestine intervened on 31 May 2024 under both Articles 62 and 63, claiming a direct legal interest in the eventual outcome. Its position openly supports the allegation that Palestinians in Gaza are being subjected to genocide.
Palestine is directly affected by the war and has an obvious reason to place its case before the Court, but it cannot simultaneously be presented as an independent and neutral confirmation of South Africa’s accusation.
Spain entered on 28 June 2024 and argued that killing, serious bodily or mental harm, forced displacement and deprivation must be assessed collectively when determining whether genocidal acts and intent exist.
That interpretation could make Pretoria’s allegation easier to establish, but Spain is still presenting a legal argument about how evidence should be assessed. It is not arriving with proof that the final legal threshold has already been crossed.
Türkiye intervened on 7 August 2024 and strongly supports South Africa’s position, arguing that Israel’s conduct must be considered as a complete pattern rather than as isolated events.
That stance is consistent with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s openly hostile political posture towards Israel, and it is reasonable to ask how much of Türkiye’s involvement arises from independently assessed evidence and how much reflects an established geopolitical position.
Chile filed its declaration on 12 September 2024, arguing that genocidal intent may be inferred from a consistent pattern of conduct and the surrounding circumstances.
This assists Pretoria’s legal argument, but it still does not establish the central fact that must eventually be proven:
that Israel’s purpose was to destroy Palestinians as a people rather than to destroy Hamas as a military organisation.
The Maldives intervened on 1 October 2024 and focused on civilian deaths, displacement, deprivation of essential supplies and living conditions allegedly calculated to cause physical destruction.
These are grave matters that must be examined, but the consequences of war and the specific intention to destroy a protected group remain separate legal questions.
Bolivia followed on 8 October 2024 and has openly supported South Africa’s case. Its government has also been politically aligned with the anti-Israel bloc for years.
Political alignment does not automatically invalidate its submission, but neither can that alignment be displayed as independent proof that genocide occurred.
Ireland entered the proceedings on 6 January 2025, concentrating on humanitarian assistance, collective punishment, civilian protection and the interpretation of the prohibited acts listed in the Convention.
Its arguments may assist South Africa, but Ireland did not arrive carrying a judgment that genocide had already been proven. It supplied legal interpretation, not a verdict.
Cuba intervened four days later, on 10 January 2025, and openly supports both the Palestinian position and Pretoria’s use of the Genocide Convention against Israel.
Cuba’s longstanding alignment against Israel and the United States is part of the political context and cannot simply be ignored. That alignment may explain its position, but it is not evidence of genocidal intent.
Belize filed on 30 January 2025 under both Articles 62 and 63, claiming a legal interest in the proceedings while supporting a broader interpretation of the Convention.
Its participation adds another flag to the coalition Pretoria displays, but an application to intervene remains neither evidence nor a finding of guilt.
Brazil intervened on 17 September 2025 and argues that the cumulative effects of Israel’s military operations must be examined when determining whether the Convention has been violated.
That is a legitimate legal argument for the Court to consider, but the Court must still distinguish between political condemnation, possible violations of humanitarian law and the very specific crime of genocide.
Comoros followed on 29 October 2025, supporting South Africa’s position and a broader interpretation of destructive conditions, deprivation and genocidal intent.
Comoros is also a member of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. That does not disqualify its submission, but it forms part of the political background when its flag is presented as supposedly independent confirmation of Pretoria’s claim.
Belgium entered on 23 December 2025 and supports judicial scrutiny of Israel’s conduct while advancing interpretations that could broaden the circumstances from which prohibited acts and genocidal intent may be inferred.
Once again, the submission may assist Pretoria, but it does not establish the one element South Africa must ultimately prove:
Israel’s specific intention to destroy Palestinians as a protected group.
Iceland intervened on 11 March 2026 and leans towards a broader interpretation involving displacement, deprivation, civilian harm and the circumstances from which intent may be inferred.
It is an argument about how the Court should examine the evidence. It is not independent factual confirmation that the evidence already proves genocide.
Namibia entered on 12 March 2026 and clearly supports South Africa, arguing that genocidal intent must be assessed through the complete context and combined pattern of conduct.
Namibia’s own history of genocide gives its voice moral significance, but historical experience cannot replace the evidentiary requirement to prove Israel’s intention in this particular war.
THE COUNTRY THAT HAS NOT PRETENDED TO DECIDE THE FACTS
The Netherlands intervened on 11 March 2026 and made an important distinction. Its government explicitly stated that its declaration does not determine the disputed facts or conditions on the ground. It confines itself to explaining how parts of the Genocide Convention should be interpreted.
The Netherlands argues that the available evidence should be considered comprehensively and that forced displacement or deprivation of humanitarian assistance may, in certain circumstances, contribute to proving prohibited acts or genocidal intent.
Parts of that interpretation may assist South Africa, but the Netherlands has not declared Israel guilty and cannot honestly be displayed as a country that confirmed Pretoria’s accusation.
THE COUNTRIES RESISTING PRETORIA’S APPROACH
Paraguay intervened on 3 March 2026 to defend the original, narrow meaning of genocide. It insists that the crime requires proof of a specific intention to destroy a protected group and warns against weakening that requirement.
Paraguay is formally involved in the same proceedings, but no honest account could count it as part of South Africa’s coalition.
The United States entered on 12 March 2026 and explicitly rejected the genocide accusation as false. Its submission argues that widespread civilian casualties, even on a horrific scale, do not automatically establish genocidal intent, particularly during urban warfare against an armed organisation operating from within civilian areas.
Its intervention warns that lowering the threshold would transform genocide from a precisely defined crime into a political label applied to any destructive war.
Hungary intervened on the same day and also insists upon a high evidentiary threshold. Its position warns against taking possible violations of international humanitarian law and simply re-labelling them as genocide without proving the additional and very specific intention required by the Convention.
Hungary is inside the same courtroom, but it is there to challenge Pretoria’s legal approach — not to support it.
Fiji’s intervention also demands strong proof of both the prohibited acts and the intention to destroy the protected group. It raises concerns about relying uncritically upon politically contested reports from international organisations and advocacy groups.
Fiji is involved in the case, but it is not there to endorse South Africa.
WHAT THE NUMBERS ACTUALLY SHOW
There are now 21 states formally involved as interveners. Sixteen broadly support, lean towards or legally assist parts of Pretoria’s approach. The Netherlands restricts itself to legal interpretation without deciding the facts. Paraguay, the United States, Hungary and Fiji defend a stricter interpretation that challenges South Africa’s case.
That is not an international verdict. It is not 21 independent bodies of evidence, 21 witnesses confirming genocidal intent or 21 governments arriving at the same legal conclusion.
South Africa is entitled to bring its case, and every state party is entitled to offer its interpretation of the Genocide Convention. What Pretoria is not entitled to do is convert legal participation into political endorsement and then present the number of flags surrounding the proceedings as proof that the accusation has already been established.
The International Court of Justice has not found Israel guilty of genocide. Its provisional orders were issued to preserve possible rights and prevent irreparable harm while the case continues. They were not a final judgment that genocide had occurred, yet that distinction has repeatedly disappeared from the political narrative.
THE WAR DID NOT BEGIN INSIDE A COURTROOM
On 7 October 2023, Hamas-led forces crossed into Israel and deliberately attacked civilian communities. Approximately 1,200 people were killed and more than 250 were abducted and taken into Gaza.
Those civilians were not accidentally caught between two armies. Civilians were among the intended targets.
Hamas then returned to one of the most densely populated territories on earth with the hostages. It continued operating through an extensive military system built within and beneath civilian areas, with fighters, weapons, command facilities and tunnel entrances positioned in or near locations protected by their civilian function.
This did not remove Israel’s duty to distinguish between combatants and civilians. Civilian casualties are never irrelevant, and every credible allegation of unlawful conduct must be investigated.
It did, however, create a battlefield in which reaching Hamas would inevitably place civilians at risk, while every civilian casualty could be turned into political and strategic pressure against Israel. Hamas had constructed a war in which it could benefit from either outcome:
survive beneath the civilian population, or gain international support from the destruction caused when Israel came underground to find it.
The suffering in Gaza is real and devastating. Acknowledging that suffering does not require us to erase the organisation that started the war, murdered civilians, retained hostages and embedded its military machinery within the civilian environment upon which the war would be fought.
War crimes, disproportionate force and genocide are not interchangeable terms. Genocide requires proof of a specific intention to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group because it is that group.
Civilian deaths alone do not prove that intention. Destruction alone does not prove it. Political speeches, operational failures and even serious violations of the laws of war cannot simply be stacked together until they automatically become genocide.
The required intention must still be proven.
THE FLAGS CAN NO LONGER HIDE THE DIFFERENCES
Colombia has changed course and withdrawn. Nicaragua stepped back before it. Their decisions do not determine the case, but they prove that intervention is neither permanent nor beyond reconsideration.
The remaining governments must now clarify what their flags represent. If they possess independently verified evidence that Israel intended to destroy the Palestinian people, they must produce that evidence and stand openly behind the accusation.
If they intervened only to explain how the Genocide Convention should be interpreted, they must publicly reject any attempt by Pretoria to use their participation as proof that they endorsed South Africa’s factual claims.
If their involvement was driven primarily by ideological alignment, diplomatic pressure or bloc politics rather than independently assessed evidence, they should follow Colombia and withdraw.
The ANC government may possess the executive authority to conduct South Africa’s foreign policy, but it does not own the conscience of every South African whose name it carried into that courtroom. Neither does it own the flags of other governments merely because they entered the proceedings to speak about the law.
Pretoria cannot have it both ways.
It cannot count every intervention as support when addressing its political audience and then retreat behind legal technicalities when asked what those countries actually proved.
The choice facing every government involved is now clear:
● Stand behind the genocide accusation and produce the evidence.
● Clarify publicly that your intervention concerns legal interpretation and does not endorse Pretoria’s factual claims.
● If your flag is there only because political alignment placed it there, withdraw it.
Twenty-one flags may create an impressive photograph. They do not create evidence, they do not establish intent, and they do not amount to a verdict.
About the writer:
Shaun Schutte is a South African security professional, independent writer and founder of Black Knight Bodyguards. He served for eight years in the South African Defence Force before spending seventeen years in international close protection and security operations across conflict environments including Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola and Somalia. His writing draws on this operational background to examine asymmetric warfare, terrorism, protective security and the political narratives surrounding modern conflict. He writes from the perspective of a practitioner rather than an academic, combining publicly available evidence with lessons gained through direct experience in unstable and hostile environments.
SOURCES
International Court of Justice—declarations of intervention:
https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/intervention
ICJ confirmation of Colombia’s withdrawal and current list of intervening states:
https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icj-press-release-22sep26
International Court of Justice—complete case record:
https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192
While the mission of Lay of the Land (LotL) is to provide a wide and diverse perspective of affairs in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world, the opinions, beliefs and viewpoints expressed by its various writers are not necessarily ones of the owners and management of LOTL but of the writers themselves. LotL endeavours to the best of its ability to credit the use of all known photographs to the photographer and/or owner of such photographs (0&EO).
