Rubio has delivered a diplomatic breakthrough. Now comes the difficult task of turning a framework into lasting security.
By Andrew Fox
For the first time in 44 years, Israel and Lebanon have put their names to a framework agreement. Rubio is presenting it as a first step toward ending the conflict, restoring Lebanese sovereignty, dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, and creating a verifiable path toward security on Israel’s northern border. The deal reportedly begins with two pilot zones, into which the Lebanese Armed Forces will enter as Israel redeploys. At the same time, the IDF remains in Lebanese territory for as long as Hezbollah continues to pose a threat.
This agreement is a meaningful development. It is also where the hard part begins. The agreement creates a process, not an outcome, and the central question is whether anyone can impose that process and outcome on Hezbollah. According to the framework text, Israeli withdrawal is tied to the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure. That sounds straightforward in Washington. In Lebanon, it runs straight into the political and coercive reality of Hezbollah.
Iran will not let Hezbollah go quietly into that good night. For decades, Hezbollah has been an integral part of Tehran’s regional architecture: a military asset in the plan to destroy Israel, a deterrent, and a lever in wider negotiations. It has proven its utility both by striking inside Israel’s borders and by keeping Lebanon diplomatically tied to Iran’s confrontation with Israel. From Tehran’s perspective, the disarmament of Hezbollah would be a catastrophic strategic loss.
That said, Hezbollah is far more than a line item in an Iranian budget. It has its own funding streams, including smuggling, illicit trade, and international criminal networks. Pressure on Tehran alone will not collapse Hezbollah’s operating capacity. The group has spent years building redundancy into its financing, logistics, and social control.
The pilot-zone mechanism is therefore the key test. The Lebanese army’s entry into the first two areas could be a useful beginning, especially if it establishes a precedent for state authority in places where Hezbollah has long treated Beirut’s sovereignty as an irrelevance. The problem is that Hezbollah overmatches the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in most important respects: firepower, salaries, coercive capacity, embedded networks, and willingness to intimidate local opponents.
(On the origins of Hezbollah – see here.)
The success or failure of the deal hinges on operational freedom. If Israel hands areas to the LAF and the LAF cannot prevent Hezbollah retrenchment, can Israel still act? Israeli officials are already saying the IDF will retain freedom of action in the security zone and remain until Hezbollah and other armed groups no longer pose a threat. That answers part of the Israeli security concern, but “pose a threat” is a loose definition and “no longer” may be doing some heavy lifting. Still, it also creates an obvious point of Lebanese and Hezbollah resistance: an agreement framed as restoring sovereignty may be attacked domestically as legitimising an open-ended Israeli presence.
The risk of Lebanese civil war is already more than a theoretical problem. Hezbollah has already rejected the deal, with Naim Qassem describing it as a surrender and saying the group will continue armed resistance. We have seen reports today of an Israeli drone strike in southern Lebanon, in an area outside the newly defined Israeli-held zone. In other words, the announcement has not suspended the underlying dynamics of the conflict.
The same question applies beyond the south. What happens in Hezbollah’s depth areas, including the Bekaa Valley and the logistical corridors that keep Hezbollah in the fight? Can Israel still strike weapons flows, command nodes, and rearmament infrastructure there under the terms of this deal? A framework that manages the border while leaving Hezbollah’s rear areas intact may reduce friction without meaningfully changing the balance of power in Lebanon.
There is also the view from northern Israel. If residents of Kiryat Shmona, Metula, Manara, and other border communities still believe Hezbollah can rebuild observation posts, restore launch capacity, or prepare another frontier shock, displaced Israelis will not return simply because a framework exists. They will only return if the facts on the ground change, visibly and durably.
The Lebanese side faces an equally hard political problem. Hezbollah’s power inside Shia communities rests on welfare provision, patronage, identity, coercion, and deep disillusionment with the Lebanese state. If Lebanon is serious about replacing Hezbollah’s order with state authority, it has to offer more than checkpoints, and foreign-backed security plans. It has to offer protection, services, and a political alternative that does not leave communities feeling exposed.
So, yes: this is progress. A signed Israel-Lebanon framework after 44 years is not nothing, and the pilot-zone model gives the parties something concrete to test. The right posture, however, is cautious scepticism. The success of this deal depends on enforcement, verification, Israeli freedom of action, LAF capacity, Hezbollah’s coercive response, Iran’s tolerance for strategic loss, and Lebanon’s ability to offer its Shia citizens something better than the status quo. Until those details are clear, this is a good first step but it is not yet a settlement.
About the writer:
A veteran of three grueling tours of Afghanistan, Major Andrew Fox holds a Batchelor’s degree in Law & Politics, a Master’s in Military History & War Studies, Msc in Psychology and is currently studying for a PhD in History.
*Feature picture: ‘Sign’ of the Times. The historic signing of the Israel-Lebanon-U.S. “Trilateral Framework Agreement” is intended to contribute to regional transformation by envisioning an eventual normalization of relations between the two states of Israel and Lebanon. (Photo: AP Photo/Kevin Wolf)
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